How Internal Wealth Influences Communities’ Prospects Post-Covid

by Dante Chinni and Ari Pinkus May 11, 2022 Print


The Covid-19 pandemic has reshuffled the U.S. economy on a fundamental level. Everything has changed — from how and where Americans work, to the way they shop and entertain, to how they conduct business meetings. More than two years after the first nationwide Covid shutdown, movie theaters are still mostly empty, and many restaurants have not bounced back. Schools have largely returned to normal, but with an eye out for new variants. These are the kinds of large-scale shifts that are causing uncertainty and upheaval in communities across the country.

But all the changes have also unfolded on a very uneven landscape and have the potential to lead to vastly varied impacts on communities’ social and economic health.

The data show how some communities went into the pandemic with strong economies to protect them, while others started off with deeper challenges across many areas, from unemployment to income inequality to homeownership. Together, the numbers show just how complicated the road out of the pandemic will be. Like a relay race with a staggered start, some places have inherent advantages that are only likely to grow as the recovery unfolds and the worst parts of Covid drift into the rear-view mirror. Others are likely to find themselves not only trying to recover from the virus but also adjusting to the new world from a lagging position with little way to make up ground.

The data serve as a reminder that the national narratives coming out of the pandemic do not adequately explain what is actually happening on the ground in different kinds of places. And finding a “new normal” is likely to take much longer in some communities than in others.

For this report, the American Communities Project worked with the Economic Innovation Group to analyze asset income per capita across the ACP’s 15 county types. That is income specifically from dividends, interest, and collected rent. The numbers are a baseline for this report because they go to the heart of a broader question of economic health at the community level.

“The pandemic has underscored the divide in financial security and well-being between the Americans who own assets and those who do not,” EIG Research Director Kenan Fikri said upon the release of the organization’s asset income report in August 2021. “The overall economy is booming and asset prices are soaring, but many American communities are left out with little direct stake in the wealth created on financial markets. Building wealth inclusively will require expanded and innovative pathways to increase asset ownership for more American families.”

The larger truth behind these words still holds. The EIG analysis looked at asset income in the ACP types going back 50 years. During the last 10 years, a group of communities has emerged above others, showing steady asset income growth. The most urban community types, the Big Cities and Urban Suburbs; the agriculture-driven Aging Farmlands; and the Graying America retirement havens stand above the rest of the ACP types.

On the other end is a set of ACP types that lack those advantages, and most of them are home to large communities of color: Hispanic Centers, Native American Lands, African American South as well as Working Class Country and Evangelical Hubs. As those communities look to emerge from the pandemic, they not only lack that asset income stream but also face long-term challenges on issues such as child poverty.

The way those advantages and difficulties play out at the community level will be important for policymakers to understand as the nation adjusts to life after Covid-19. There won’t be simple one-size-fits-all answers, but solutions that draw on the resources of particular places and fit their demographics and terrains.

Dividends, Interest and Rent per Capita

= median
Note: Pitken County, Colo. ($98,480 per capita) and Teton County, Wyo. ($161,410) are excluded from the chart due to being extreme outliers.

 

To explore how these data fit with the strengths and challenges of the different community types in the ACP, we use the latest data from the County Health Rankings & Roadmaps in the second half of this report. We examine where each type stands on unemployment, poverty, income inequality, housing, and segregation.

Asset Income by ACP Type

If communities with higher asset incomes start off in a better position on the path out of the Covid-19 pandemic, the ACP typology points to a set of communities with a notable advantage. Four community types stand out among the 15 types. Urban Suburbs, Big Cities, Aging Farmlands, and Graying America all have a per capita asset income of $12,000 or more.

In some ways, they are curious mix of places. Big Cities and Urban Suburbs are often in close proximity in economic data. They tend to be home to more people with college degrees and higher incomes; greater population density; and bigger, wealthier employers. On issues of economic attainment, it is not common to have those two places grouped with rural communities, such as the Aging Farmlands and Graying America. What’s behind this peculiar alignment? Different kinds of people and assets.

It’s logical that the Urban Suburbs ($14,190 in asset income per capita) and Big Cities ($13,860 in asset income per capita) are the top two groups here. The assets being measured here are dividends, interest, and collected rent. And these communities are more likely to have people who own stocks and bonds, and people who own real estate.

The higher incomes in both community types mean people often have bigger investment portfolios. So as the stock market thrived during the pandemic (even as other parts of the economy stalled out), many people in the Big Cities and Urban Suburbs could log into their investment accounts and feel comfortable. Many residents in these communities also held the kind of jobs where “working from home” was an option, further insulating them from the worse effects of Covid-19.

Real estate is more complicated. Home prices and rents have skyrocketed in Big Cities and Urban Suburbs in recent years, and that may be a drag on the personal economic situations of some in these communities. But these same communities are more likely to be the homes of landlords who own rental properties in urban areas. So as housing prices and rents rise, that money largely stays “at home” in Big Cities and Urban Suburbs.

The economy of Aging Farmlands ($12,400 in asset income per capita) has long operated differently than that of the rest of the country. These communities are not focused on Wall Street but are built around agriculture. Although they rarely look ostentatious, there is a lot of wealth in them. Farmers aren’t just people who plow fields, they are extremely attuned to global commodity markets. Go to an Aging Farmland community, where the price of a bushel of corn or wheat is on everyone’s tongue or their smartphone screen. People in these places know returns can be about when futures contracts are signed and harvests are sold.

Land is an enormous part of wealth and renting plots — to other farmers or to outsiders as game refuges — can be extremely lucrative. In some ways, these communities may have been the most insulated from the short-term economic impacts of Covid. Add in the fact that “social distancing” is part of everyday life in these extremely rural places and their advantage grows.

Graying America ($12,390 in asset income per capita) may be the biggest surprise on this list, but it has a few big advantages in terms of asset income. First, many of these communities have become retirement centers for aging baby boomers. After years on the job, they take their accumulated wealth and stock portfolios to rural cities and towns they have come to know through vacations and weekend getaways. Look at the map of Graying America, and you’ll notice lots of places on water or in the mountains. These kinds of places catch the eyes of people with a few dollars, and suddenly more free time. (An analysis of the 2020 census shows about half of Graying American counties gained people in the last decade, bucking a larger trend of rural places losing population).

As those Graying America tourist destinations add people and grow in popularity, they have also benefited from the home vacation rental market. Short-term vacation rental income from sites such as VRBO have added greatly to the rental income of these communities. And during Covid, when overseas travel and even hotel stays were a no-go for many people, Graying America was a winner.

Second Tier

The next six community types bunch together, from just under $10,000 to just above $8,000 in asset income per capita. All these communities are comfortably middle-income, but felt the effects of Covid-19 differently, given their demographics and locations. The communities run the geographical gamut — from LDS Enclaves in the interior West to College Towns scattered around the country, Exurbs in the outlying suburbs of cities, Middle Suburbs ringing cities in the Rust Belt, Military Posts on and around bases, and Rural Middle America, encompassing 599 counties along America’s upper half from Maine through the Great Lakes to Montana to Washington.

The asset income per capita in College Towns is $9,998. These middle-income communities emptied out when Covid hit but have been coming back since the fall of 2021 with the widespread distribution of vaccines. As younger communities, they did not suffer the losses of more densely populated communities with a greater age range. These communities are also loaded with renters — college students, graduate students, and even professors stay for a few seasons, then move on.

In Exurbs, the asset income per capita is $9,350. Exurbs are considered relatively wealthy among the 15 types with some rural attributes. Here, residents tend to be more settled. Dividends and interest are common and important assets. During the pandemic, many white-collar residents were able to work from home, their retirement plans growing as the stock market soared. And newcomers bought homes, freed from the constraints of commuting to a downtown office.

Military Posts‘ asset income per capita is $9,320. Like College Towns, military communities are younger and more transitory. Government paychecks where money is invested in retirement accounts are the norm. In August 2021, the Department of Defense took steps to mitigate Covid effects, requiring all service members to be vaccinated against the virus.

Rural Middle America’s asset income per capita is $8,720. These places are defined by small towns, and like Exurbs, tend to have more established residents. Unlike Aging Farmlands, they are not heavily reliant on agriculture, but driven by a mix of ag, manufacturing, and services, which took a hit during the pandemic. Assets, of course, go hand in hand with people. Youth and older residents have been leaving these communities for more opportunity and a better quality of life; the 2020 census confirms a 0.3% population decline in the past decade.

LDS Enclaves’ asset income per capita is $8,480. These younger communities are the centers of the nation’s Mormon population — and they are growing. The 2020 census shows LDS Enclave growth at 17.7%. Twenty-nine percent of the population in LDS Enclaves are under 18, with fewer assets to their name yet. Only 14% are over 65, a population that tends to have more assets. In some parts, the tech industry is burgeoning. In 2021, Salt Lake City (in Salt Lake County, an LDS Enclave) was one of six cities to document “impressive” growth, according to a report from the Computing Technology Industry Association. The Silicon Slopes in Utah are concentrated around Salt Lake.

In Middle Suburbs, asset income per capita is $8,170. Middle Suburbs have been hard hit by the effects of globalization in the past 30 years. Manufacturing layoffs were constant in the 1990s and 2000s. Once heavily unionized, these communities have struggled in recent decades. They lack the high incomes and investment portfolios of other urban communities.

Rear Tier

Bringing up the rear are the communities of color — African American South, Hispanic Centers, and Native American Lands — as well as working-class white communities in Appalachia and the South, all places where long-standing structural inequities permeate daily life and robust economic development is atypical. Covid is among many ongoing difficulties. Of the 15 ACP types, Evangelical Hubs, Hispanic Centers, Working Class Country, and African American South counties have seen the least amount of change in asset income per capita since 1990, only rising $760 to $1,260 in 30 years.

Agriculture is a dominant industry in Hispanic Centers, where the asset income per capita is $7,300. Hispanic Centers are home for many younger residents and immigrants, some of whom are sending money earned from working on farms and in hospitality and meatpacking plants to family outside these communities.

Working Class Country’s asset income per capita sits at $6,770. Coal country has felt the loss of its dominant industry. Bright spots: These mostly white communities concentrated in Appalachia can be inexpensive vacation destinations, draws for their country settings and picturesque views.

Native American Lands have a host of difficulties that hold down their asset income per capita to $6,440. On Indian reservations, many people work in the underground economy and do not use banks or own much. Generational poverty is an ongoing challenge. A mindset of giving is also common here, one in which people share whatever they have with someone who has less.

The African American South’s challenges seem just as deep-seated. Here the asset income per capita is $6,180. These rural communities also lack economic development. Moreover, segregation between Blacks and whites remains a fact of daily life — and that includes assets such as rental income, dividends, and interest.

In neighboring Evangelical Hubs, the asset income per capita is the lowest of the 15 types at $5,960. In these older, white communities, religion is a pillar of life, but industry is scarce and infrastructure, including housing, is often subpar.

Diverse Socioeconomic Landscapes

The asset income numbers in the first half of this report offer a sense of the underlying resources in the ACP’s 15 community types, but those resources make up only a part of the picture of those places. The community types sit in distinct socioeconomic landscapes that lead to different underlying strengths and challenges. To understand those landscapes, the ACP worked with the County Health Rankings & Roadmaps, analyzing the CHRR measures through the ACP typology.

This section examines what those measures can tell us about four major areas: unemployment, poverty, housing, and segregation.

Unemployment and Labor

Most of those who have paid attention to the economic impacts of Covid-19 know the story of unemployment. March 2020 brought a massive shock to the system when the nation ground to a halt and businesses shuttered — some temporarily, some permanently — as the parameters of the pandemic’s effects became known. A large portion of the population went on paid and unpaid leave and then, slowly, they went back to work, many from home. Others waited, unsure of whether and when it was safe to return to work.

But the impacts across the ACP’s 15 types were very uneven. Some communities have a greater share of jobs that can be shifted to “work from home” than others. Some rely more heavily on tourism dollars. And some communities consistently have lower unemployment rates than others simply due to their employer base.

To gain a solid understanding of what happened by community type, you have to consider two factors: the unemployment rate and the labor force figures. Since the unemployment spike that arrived with Covid in 2020, the numbers have improved dramatically, back to near pre-pandemic levels. But in many cases, that drop has happened with fewer people in the workforce — that is particularly true in some community types.

Comparing February 2022 (the latest data) to February 2020 (the last month before the pandemic hit), you see that the unemployment rates dipped in almost half of the ACP types.

 

The Native American Lands have seen the biggest decline, with an unemployment rate that has dropped by 0.7 points. LDS Enclaves and Aging Farmlands have also seen big drops, more than half a percentage point, in that time. Those types are among the most rural ones in the ACP. However, simply saying “rural communities weathered Covid better” misses some big differences in those declines. Even with the declines, Native American Lands still have a relatively high unemployment rate, 6%, meanwhile LDS Enclaves and Aging Farmlands have the lowest unemployment rates in the ACP, both under 3%. The point: Simply measuring the change in the unemployment rate misses a lot of subtlety. (More on that in the discussion of labor force.)

The data suggest urban places have had a tougher time getting back to their pre-Covid norms. The Big Cities alone have an unemployment rate that is a full point higher than it was in February 2020. Some of that increase may be due to offices still being largely empty in many major cities — meaning there is less need for services (cafes, restaurants, etc.) around them. The Urban Suburbs have also seen a jump of half a point and the Exurbs are up 0.3 points. Those increases are somewhat surprising considering those communities are generally home to more college degrees and white-collar jobs (the kinds spared a lot of loss during the pandemic). But the data indicate the economic pain may have been more widespread than understood in most analyses, with service sector job losses being widespread.

The numbers also point to BIPOC (Black, Indigenous, People of Color) communities being hit harder than other places in the pandemic. African American South counties and Hispanic Centers tend to be more rural than others, but they still saw significant increases in unemployment compared to their less racially diverse rural counterparts, such as Rural Middle America and Evangelical Hubs.

And none of that takes into account the change in labor force numbers that have become a big part of the Covid economy story. Two-thirds of the ACP types saw a drop in their labor force (the number of people actively looking for a job) in February 2022 compared to February 2020.

Big Cities and Urban Suburbs lead the way for the largest drop in the workforce. Some of that is to be expected because they hold the most workers, and as mentioned above, their economies took hits in the service sector.

The most prominent dip, however, may be the small-town Rural Middle American communities. Those counties have less than a third of the population of the Big Cities and Urban Suburbs, but their labor force reduction was almost the same size, about 216,000 fewer people.

Again, there are signs in the labor force data that some rural communities may be rebounding a little better than the nation as a whole. Of the five communities that saw an increase in labor force, four of them — Aging Farmlands, Graying America, LDS Enclaves, and Military Posts — generally have lower population densities.

In terms of adding workers, the biggest winner was the Exurbs. The counties, generally on the edge of urban areas, added almost 400,000 workers. They may have gained from workers commuting to cities less frequently and using services more closely located to their homes.

The labor force numbers also suggest that communities of color have had a harder time recovering from the Covid. The three ACP types with large communities of color all experienced drops in their workforce: the African American South, Hispanic Centers and Native American Lands. Although the drop in the Native American Lands is the smallest, it is the largest as a percentage of its workforce — eliminating the gain those communities made in their overall unemployment rate.

Income Inequality

In many communities, the question of resources is complicated by the fact that they are spread out unevenly. That means that even if a community looks healthy in the data, on the ground there can be vast differences between haves and have-nots that require more spending on social programs. The CHRR measures income inequality by measuring the ratio of household income at the 80th percentile to income at the 20th percentile. There are stark differences within the ACP community types. The numbers range from a low of 3.8 in the LDS Enclaves to high of 5.2 in the African American South and Native American Lands.

There are some surprises in the numbers here.

It is often assumed that more urban areas have higher amounts of inequality as they are generally home to great wealth and great poverty. And there is some evidence for that in these figures. The Big Cities at 4.7 and the Urban Suburbs at 4.6 have some of the higher inequality scores.

However, the highest numbers here belong to two rural community types with large BIPOC communities: the African American South at 5.2 and the Native American Lands at 5.2. (It should be noted the Hispanic Centers are lower at 4.5.) Those figures suggest that a big part of economic inequality in the United States is tied to racial and ethnic disparities. It also suggests that coming out of the pandemic, rural communities may need special attention.

It also should be noted that racial and ethnic homogeneity may play a role in lower economic inequality figures. The two community types with the lowest inequality scores — LDS Enclaves and Exurbs — are a mix of suburban and rural locales. However, both are much less racially and ethnically diverse than the nation as a whole. And LDS Enclaves and Aging Farmlands are both more than 85% white, non-Hispanic.

Child Poverty

The CHRR data show radically different situations for child poverty in the ACP types, from a low of just 11% in the Exurbs to a high of 31% in the Native American Lands. In the context of other challenges during the pandemic, from schooling to unemployment, these numbers indicate the disparate community needs coming out of Covid-19.

There is, again, clearly a racial component to these data. The community types with large BIPOC populations — the African American South, Hispanic Centers, and Native American Lands — all have child poverty figures at 20% or above, and in the African American South and Native American Lands, the figure is around 30%.

The challenges in rural communities are apparent in these data as well. Two other communities have child poverty figures above 20% — Evangelical Hubs and Working Class Country — and both are predominantly white, non-Hispanic, but also largely rural.

No amount of child poverty is a positive, of course, but urban communities generally fare better on this measure. Exurbs, Middle Suburbs, and Urban Suburbs are in the top half of the ACP types of child poverty. Even the densely populated and economically diverse Big Cities are below 20%.

As the nation slowly works its way back to a new normalcy, those differences will be important to keep in mind. The challenges of urban youth tend to grab national attention, but it’s clear that rural communities face their own obstacles. And, as noted above, these are the same kinds of communities that lack internal wealth, which would help to climb out of the damage Covid has wrought. They have lower asset incomes and lower household incomes.

Housing

In another facet of community internal wealth, homeownership tends to be highest in communities with older, settled, white, and rural residents. The highest median homeowner rates are in Appalachian-based Working Class Country; middle-income, younger LDS Enclaves in the interior West; Exurbs, now popular places to raise families outside cities; and overwhelmingly white and land-rich Aging Farmlands in the plains. All stand at 77%, according to the County Health Rankings & Roadmaps. Older white rural communities, Rural Middle America and Graying America, come in close behind at 75%.

Homeownership drops precipitously in cities where population density is greatest, and owning property is at a premium. Overall, ownership is lowest among diverse, stratified, transitory, younger communities: Big Cities at 55%, College Towns at 62%, Urban Suburbs at 64%, Native American Lands at 65%, and Military Posts at 66%.

Furthermore, communities where homeownership is low often face severe housing problems, i.e., “at least one of four: overcrowding, high housing costs, lack of kitchen facilities, or lack of plumbing facilities,” according to the County Health Rankings & Roadmaps. Native American Lands and Big Cities endure the highest rates of severe housing problems at 19%; Urban Suburbs, the suburbs closest to cities, come in at 17%.

Residential Segregation

Moving beyond the home, the experience with residential segregation can be vastly different depending on the kind of community in which one lives. Segregation between whites and nonwhites tends to be greatest in more densely populated places: Middle Suburbs’ median segregation index sits at 42, Big Cities at 40, and Urban Suburbs at 38. The exception is in rural Native American Lands, where the indigenous population typically lives apart from whites. It has the highest segregation rate at 48.

Segregation between whites and nonwhites is lower among more homogenous or planned communities with Aging Farmlands, Graying America, LDS Enclaves, and Military Posts at 29, and Exurbs at 31.

In an interesting finding, Hispanic Centers — where self-identified Hispanics make up an average of 56% of the population — have the lowest segregation rate among community types at 23. This figure accounts for the demographic distinction between non-Hispanic whites and Hispanics. So it’s possible to see such a low number in this dissimilarity index because an overwhelming number of people self-identify as Hispanic in some counties and/or there’s a very high reliance on agriculture, a more integrated field.

Residential segregation between whites and Blacks is highest in predominantly white, middle-income communities in the Northeast, Midwest, and interior West: LDS Enclaves at 75 and Rural Middle America at 61.

Racially diverse and densely populated places are much lower on the index, with Big Cities at 54 and Urban Suburbs at 53. Perhaps it’s surprising that the African American South has the lowest rate of Black/white segregation at 35. This might be partly because these counties have fewer residents, and homes in these rural locales are scattered, with fewer planned neighborhoods. It’s important to note, however, that daily life in the African American South is often segregated.

The connection between communities’ internal wealth and segregation of racial/ethnic demographic groups is an area ripe for further study.

Religion

Religious Stereotypes vs. Reality in Urban, Suburban, and Rural America

by PRRI and American Communities Project Staff April 15, 2022

The divide between rural and urban America has come to define American culture and politics in the 21st century. Urban areas are becoming increasingly Democratic, while rural areas are becoming increasingly Republican. However, the divides in experiences, cultures, and ways of life are not without an important dose of nuance.

Combining data from the Public Religion Research Institute’s 2020 Census of American Religion and the American Communities Project, we can further understand both the dynamics and the nuances of religious divisions between urban and rural America. PRRI’s county-level estimates of the sizes of major religious groups classified by the American Communities Project county typology reveal a patchwork of faith experiences that illuminates commonalities and differences across the urban-rural divide.

Urban areas are often stereotyped as bastions of secularism, while rural areas are often portrayed as dominated by the traditional church. While these clichés may have grains of truth within them, there is significantly more nuance to the experiences of faith in rural and urban communities.

Urban and Suburban Counties

Most residents of counties classified as Big Cities and Urban Suburbs claim a religious affiliation — 72% in Big Cities and 74% in Urban Suburbs — although their religious affiliations are among the most diverse in the country, and Christians make up a smaller portion of the faithful there than elsewhere. Around two-thirds of residents of these most densely populated counties claim a Christian affiliation (66% in Big Cities and 68% in Urban Suburbs), while six percent of residents of each of the county types claim a non-Christian affiliation. More than one-quarter of residents of Big Cities (28%) and Urban Suburbs (26%) are religiously unaffiliated.

In the Middle Suburbs counties, 76% of the population claims a religious affiliation. In the Exurbs counties, the figure is 78%. These counties are less densely populated and more racially and ethnically homogeneous, and are more likely than their Big Cities or Urban Suburbs counterparts to follow Christian faiths (75% in Middle Suburbs and 77% in Exurbs). Smaller numbers – roughly one to four percent – follow religions other than Christianity, and less than one in four residents of Middle Suburbs (24%) and Exurbs (22%) are religiously unaffiliated.

Taking a deeper look at these communities shows some key contrasts: White Christian shares are larger in suburban and exurban areas, while Christians of color are more likely to live in urban areas. White Protestant groups are about half the size in Big Cities and Urban Suburbs (10% and 11% for white evangelical Protestants, 10% and 11% for white mainline Protestants, respectively) than they are in Exurbs or Middle Suburbs (28% and 23% for white evangelical Protestants, 20% and 20% for white mainline Protestants, respectively). Shares of white Catholics are smaller in Big Cities (10%) than in Urban Suburbs (16%), Exurbs (13%), and Middle Suburbs (20%). However, the opposite is true for Hispanic Catholics: 10% of residents of Big Cities are Hispanic Catholic, compared to eight percent of residents of Urban Suburbs, three percent of residents of Exurbs, and two percent of residents of Middle Suburbs. Larger shares of Black Protestants can be found in Big Cities (12%) and in Urban Suburbs (9%) than in Exurbs (5%) and Middle Suburbs (4%).

Big Cities and Urban Suburbs are the only communities where shares of any individual non-Christian religious residents make up more than one percent of the population. In Big Cities, two percent of residents are Jewish, two percent are Muslim, one percent are Hindu, and one percent are Buddhist. In Urban Suburbs, three percent of residents are Jewish, while Muslims, Hindus, and Buddhists each make up one percent. One percent of residents of Exurbs and Middle Suburbs are Jewish, while less than half of one percent of residents are Muslims, Hindus, or Buddhists.

Rural and Working Class Country

Religion outside urban and suburban areas is dominated by Christian beliefs.

Around three-quarters or more residents are Christians, including 73% of Graying America, 78% of Rural Middle America, 80% of Working Class Country, 83% of Aging Farmlands, and 83% of Evangelical Hubs. White evangelical Protestants make up more than four in ten residents of Evangelical Hubs (45%) and Working Class Country, but their shares are smaller in Aging Farmlands (34%), Rural Middle America (30%), and Graying America (26%). White mainline Protestants make up around one-fifth to one-quarter of these communities, including 19% of Evangelical Hubs, 21% of Graying America, 23% of Working Class Country, 26% of Rural Middle America, and 30% of Aging Farmlands. Shares of white Catholics are larger in Rural Middle America (15%), Aging Farmlands (13%), and Graying America (12%) than in Working Class Country (8%) and Evangelical Hubs (5%).

While these five community types are mostly white, their geographies and incomes vary. Incomes are lower in Working Class Country counties, centered in Appalachia, and Evangelical Hubs counties, in Appalachia and throughout the South. Along with the African American South next door, these communities comprise the traditional “Bible Belt.” Despite their similarities, cultural tensions often surface as a result of racial and residential segregation.

The three other community types, all middle-income, dominate in the Midwest and the West. Aging Farmlands counties are gathered in the Great Plains. Rural Middle America fills 599 counties in the country’s upper half, from Maine to Montana to Washington. Graying America counties fill the West and are also scattered across the Great Lakes region, the far Northeast, and Florida.

Groups of Christians of color are extremely small in these communities. Less than one in ten residents of Evangelical Hubs are Black Protestants (6%), while four percent of residents of Graying America are Hispanic Catholics and two percent are Hispanic Protestants. Other than these small shares, Hispanic Protestants, Hispanic Catholics, and Black Protestants make up one percent or less of the population of these communities. Residents who follow non-Christian religions make up less than half of one percent of these rural and working-class communities.

Interestingly, around one-quarter of residents of Graying America are religiously unaffiliated, compared to smaller shares of Rural Middle America (22%), Working Class Country (20%), Evangelical Hubs (17%), and Aging Farmlands (17%).

Race and Faith Experiences Outside the Cities

Aside from Big Cities and Urban Suburbs, the only other communities where less than half of residents are white Christians are Hispanic Centers, Native American Lands, and the African American South.

Around one-quarter of residents of Hispanic Centers are Hispanic Catholics (27%), while an additional nine percent are Hispanic Protestants. Even in Hispanic Centers, there are still significant shares of white evangelical Protestants (21%) and white mainline Protestants (12%). Residents of Hispanic Centers are some of the least likely to be religiously unaffiliated (17%).

In Native American Lands, 30% of residents are Other Christians, the category of Christians that includes Native Americans, while about one-third as many are white evangelical Protestants (11%), white mainline Protestants (11%), or white Catholics (8%). Interestingly, Native American Lands include the largest shares of religiously unaffiliated Americans (32%) of any community type.

In the African American South, counties concentrated from Virginia to Texas with a median 37% Black population, nearly three in ten residents are Black Protestants (28%), while a similar share are white evangelical Protestants, 13% are white mainline Protestants, and five percent are white Catholics. Different church denominations dot the landscape. In daily life, Blacks and whites tend to segregate, including at church, but in some communities it’s common for Blacks and whites to come together to worship on holidays, including Easter and Thanksgiving. Just 14% are religiously unaffiliated, the smallest share of any community type. With the large share of Black Protestants and white evangelical Protestants, the African American South has the largest share of Christians of all community types (84%).

Unique Community Types

Three community types have notably different religious patterns from the other community types: Military Posts, College Towns, and LDS Enclaves.

Military Posts counties are often more religiously diverse than the surrounding counties. One-quarter of residents are white evangelical Protestants, while 17% are white mainline Protestants and nine percent are white Catholics. Black Protestants make up nine percent of the population, other Christians make up eight percent, Hispanic Catholics make up three percent, and two percent are Hispanic Protestants. Around one-quarter of residents are religiously unaffiliated (24%).

College Towns counties are also more diverse and less white Christian than surrounding counties: 23% are white evangelical Protestants, 20% are white mainline Protestants, and 12% are white Catholics. Small percentages are Christians of color: Black Protestants (4%), Hispanic Protestants (2%), and Hispanic Catholics (2%). College Towns are the only communities outside urban or suburban types where one percent of residents are either Jewish, Buddhist, or Hindu. More than one-quarter of residents are religiously unaffiliated (28%).

Finally, and unsurprisingly, LDS Enclaves counties are predominantly made up of Latter-Day Saints (46%). Around one in ten residents are white mainline Protestants (11%), white evangelical Protestants (10%), or white Catholics (6%). Christians of color make up small shares of the population here: Three percent are Hispanic Catholic, two percent are other Christians, and one percent are Hispanic Protestants. No other religious groups exceed half of one percent, and 21% are religiously unaffiliated.

Vol. 3 2020-2021

Deaths of Despair Across America

The American Communities Project is undertaking a 30-month study of Deaths of Despair in its 15 community types.

Learn More
Culture

Moving Beyond the Misdiagnosis of Polarization

by Rich Harwood March 23, 2022

Russia’s war of aggression has pulled America together to stand in solidarity with the Ukrainian people. But typically after these moments of unity — whether during a war, the early period of Covid, a natural disaster, or some other major event — public discourse devolves back into divisive rhetoric.

Conventional wisdom says that the reason our unity is fleeting is that Americans are polarized, leading to endless gridlock and festering problems.

But polarization is both a misdiagnosis and an excuse for why we seem unable to address the fundamental issues facing our country, and for why we plunge further into division once the glimmers of unity inevitably fade.

The Harwood Institute for Public Innovation, with the support of the American Communities Project, recently conducted 16 in-depth focus groups with Americans from cities and small towns, suburbs and rural areas, and a Native American reservation to find out the real state of our union today.

Our study, Civic Virus: Why Polarization Is a Misdiagnosis, reveals that Americans insist they are not polarized. Nor do they feel antagonistic toward their fellow citizens. I talked about the report with MSNBC’s Chuck Todd on Meet the Press Daily, who said, “It examines what might be at the heart of so much of what drives today’s toxic politics.” Here’s what’s we found:

  • People are separating and segregating themselves from one another due to unrelenting fear and anxiety about what’s happening around them and to them.

  • Many leaders, news media, and social media are intentionally stoking polarization for their own self-interest — producing a ceaseless surround sound that is engulfing people, subjecting people to an alternate reality that confuses, disorients, and destabilizes them.

  • Seeing no way out, people have an instinctive fight-or-flight response with many breaking up into smaller camps to protect themselves and gain validation, while others retreat from engaging at all.

Divisions in the country are intrinsically about social and psychological conditions — such as fear, anxiety, and isolation — rather than about ideological polarization.

When unity fades and divisive rhetoric returns, we see Americans have a very human reaction to the troubling cross-currents that undermine public life and their personal lives. They are in a perpetual state of fight or flight, only momentarily interrupted by passing events.

The good news is that while rhetoric about polarization locks us in, a different understanding of what’s happening unlocks a new path forward.

Let me be clear. The pursuit of unity, for its own sake, pushes aside real differences that as a society we need to work through. There are real differences in our nation.

If we want to rebuild the nation, then we need to move beyond the hollow rallying cry for unity. Seeking consensus is fruitless and a waste of time. Our task is to be much more practical and realistic about what it takes to move out of our current bind. We need to find targeted areas of agreement and begin working on things together.

An essential start is to reframe public discussion to focus on people’s shared aspirations about what we seek to create and stop tearing each other down. We must also bring people together across lines that have been used to divide. And we need to create more safe spaces so people can see and hear one another, instead of assuming the worst about each other’s intentions and beliefs. Only when people can talk about what they are for and what we seek to create, will they begin to regain a sense of possibility about moving forward.

While large-scale actions may be needed, they are unlikely to gain widespread support now. More progress is likely in our local communities, where we can start small, with achievable actions and concrete projects, and grow our efforts over time. That’s how we can get things rolling and restore people’s belief that they can get things done together.

I don’t just believe this is possible; wishful thinking won’t get us anywhere. I’ve seen this in my work with communities for over 30 years in hard-hit, even traumatized places like Flint, Michigan; Mobile, Alabama; and Newtown, Connecticut.

I’m seeing it right now in Reading, Pennsylvania; Lexington, Kentucky; and Clarksville, Tennessee — three communities that are moving forward on new community-driven education and community agendas at a time when acrimonious debates on such topics as critical race theory, school board elections, banning books, and masks signal nothing but division.

While each of these communities is very different in terms of its demographics, economics, and history, they created similar agendas for education that focus on such areas as the need for more mental health support for young people, after-school activities, teachers who look more like the community, and addressing inequities across schools, among others. These agendas show that people share common concerns about young people. And they demonstrate that by creating the right conditions, people can move beyond fight or flight and hot-button issues. Now, The Harwood Institute is launching the next phase of work in the communities to turn these agendas into concrete action. At the heart of this work is demonstrating how it’s possible amid the current challenging environment to take shared action and strengthen our civic culture.

It’s time to get beyond the false notion of polarization. But that requires taking practical steps that build a new trajectory of hope, one small step after another. There is no quick fix for the problems we face. Fight or flight is real, and we need meaningful responses to it if we seek to move our nation forward.

Rich Harwood is President & Founder of The Harwood Institute for Public Innovation.

Vol. 3 2020-2021

Deaths of Despair Across America

The American Communities Project is undertaking a 30-month study of Deaths of Despair in its 15 community types.

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Health

How the Omicron Wave Has Hit American Communities Differently

by Dante Chinni March 08, 2022

The United States is in a very different, and better, place on Covid-19 today than it was at the start of 2022. The omicron variant came and went quickly — cases have fallen, but only after creating record peaks in cases across the country.

Through the lens of the American Communities Project, however, the story looked different depending on the community type and two important factors:

  • how densely populated the community type is, and
  • how much of the population was vaccinated.

Places that are densely populated and where people live in tight clusters had higher case rates from January 1 to February 17. Big Cities, Military Posts, College Towns, and Urban Suburbs, for instance, all had 30% or more of their total Covid-19 cases during that time period — the highest of all 15 community types.

More rural communities — Aging Farmlands, Rural Middle America, and Working Class Country — had 26% or fewer of their total Covid-19 cases in that time period. The three rural locales had the lowest figures of the 15 types. The numbers suggest that there was natural “social distancing” that offered protection against contracting omicron.

Covid Deaths

But looking at Covid deaths, the story looks to be much more about vaccinations. The community types with the highest death rates — Middle Suburbs, Rural Middle America, and Working Class Country — all had two-shot vaccination rates below 60%. Those three  communities experienced at least 13% of their total Covid-19 deaths from January to mid-February 2022.

The numbers suggest a complex equation of density and vaccination rates determined how badly omicron hit communities. Some densely populated places couldn’t escape omicron infections, but vaccinations warded off the worst impacts. Meanwhile, some rural places seem to have been sparsely populated enough to avoid high death rates, despite low vaccination numbers.

The places hit the hardest seem to be ones with some density coupled with low vaccination rates.

Communities with High Case Rates

Four of the top five communities for high case rates fit with omicron’s highly contagious nature. College Towns, Big Cities, Military Posts, and Urban Suburbs are all either densely populated or contain densely populated housing clusters —  dorms and barracks.

One of the trademarks of omicron was how it infected many who were trying to be vigilant around the virus, even those who masked and were careful with social interactions. That explains the high case numbers in places with tighter Covid restrictions, including big urban areas, college campuses, and military bases. With omicron, even the cautious got sick.

But it’s interesting to note that even with these higher infection rates, the death rates in these communities were more likely to be in the middle of the pack. They were not especially low, but low considering their higher infection rates.

One possible reason is high vaccination rates. As of February 17, Urban Suburbs and Big Cities had the highest vaccination rates among the ACP types. College Towns and Military Posts had lower vaccination rates, but are home to more young people, which might have prevented higher death rates there.

The African American South

African American South communities are an outlier in the group, with higher case rates and lower vaccination rates, but also lower death rates. This set of numbers requires more study, but one possibility is the higher case rates are driven by a few places with larger populations and higher rates. African American South communities tend to be rural, but also include some counties with larger cities, such as New Orleans and Greenville, N.C., both of which were far above the case rate for the type.

Those numbers could have pushed the case figure higher while the rural nature of other counties kept the overall death number lower. In the end, most people who got omicron did not die, so higher case rates in a few densely populated places could have pushed up the overall case rate for a community type that is full of many rural places.

Communities with High Death Rates

The community types with higher death rates may tell the more important story in the data. They are a collection of rural and urban places — some densely populated and some not — but mostly with lower vaccination rates.

Most interesting on the list may be the Middle Suburbs. They had the largest percentage of total Covid deaths between January 1 and February 17: 15% of all Covid deaths occurred in the six-week span. That was true even though their case numbers were among the lowest in the ACP, about 25% of all their Covid cases in that period.

Why? They have relatively low vaccination rates, under 60%, and they are fairly-densely populated. So as omicron spread, it found more unprotected people.

The same may be true, to a lesser extent, in the Exurbs. Those communities had about 13% of all the Covid deaths they’ve experienced in the period between January 1 and February 17, 2022. While they are not as densely populated as the Middle Suburbs, they often have town centers and places where people gather. They have higher vaccination rates, but still under the 65% mark.

Also with relatively high death figures during omicron were Rural Middle America and Working Class Country. Both had lower case rates between January 1 and February 17. In Rural Middle America, 25% of all their cases came at this time. In Working Class Country, the figure was 26%.

The Role of Politics

There is one other crucial point to consider for all those high death rate locales: They all voted for former President Donald Trump in the 2020 election by double digits.

Normally, drawing a line from politics to deaths from a virus would be a stretch, but that’s not true with the way this pandemic has been politicized. Mitigation efforts such as masking or even getting the Covid vaccine became directly tied to politics and whether people considered themselves supporters of Trump or not.

Some politically conservative communities, such as the very sparsely populated Aging Farmlands, were able to compensate for low vaccination rates by being so spread out that transmission of omicron was more difficult. But in communities like the Middle Suburbs and Rural Middle America, the combination of low vax rates, low mitigation actions, and just enough density appears to have created a toxic mix.

See our complete coverage of Covid-19 case rates, death rates, and vaccination rates:

 

Vol. 3 2020-2021

Deaths of Despair Across America

The American Communities Project is undertaking a 30-month study of Deaths of Despair in its 15 community types.

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Health

Confronting the Rise of Maternal Mortality

by W. Stephen Love March 04, 2022

The number of pregnancy-related deaths in the U.S. rose in 2020, the first year of the pandemic, according to a recent report from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. The report finds there were 23 deaths per 100,000 births, which is up from 20 in 2019. The report did not examine what role the pandemic played in the increase, but it could have been related to people delaying visits to health-care providers.

The report also cited racial disparities, as the maternal mortality rate for Black women was three times higher than for white women. The U.S. has the highest maternal death rate among developed countries and is the only industrialized nation where the numbers are increasing. (See factsheet.)

Black women in Texas are “disproportionately” impacted as they account for 11% of live births but 31% of maternal deaths. Texas has the highest number of uninsured residents in the U.S. and the highest percentage of uninsured women of childbearing age. Black women have higher rates of preterm birth, low birthweight, and increased infant mortality, according to Babyscripts, a virtual maternal care company. Black women are most likely to be uninsured, fall into coverage gaps when Medicaid is not expanded, and experience higher rates of chronic disease. The upcoming Black Maternal Health Week (April 11-17) will focus on these challenges in maternal health.

Some leading causes of maternal death include infection, hemorrhage, preeclampsia, and cardiovascular conditions. Studies indicate 80% of maternal deaths are preventable. Symptoms include severe headaches, dizziness, vision impairment, fever, swelling in the hands or face, depression, vaginal bleeding, suicidal thoughts, and difficulty breathing. If you have friends with these symptoms, listen to their concerns and encourage them to seek immediate care. You can also offer to go with them to the provider and talk with the doctor.

A Texas maternal mortality and morbidity review committee in 2013 found approximately one-third of pregnancy related deaths in Texas in 2013 occurred 43 days to a year after the end of pregnancy. The committee also discovered that a very high percent of these deaths could have been prevented. Since 2016, the committee’s most important recommendation has been to extend Medicaid postpartum coverage for low-income mothers to a year. The American Medical Association and the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists advocate for longer postpartum care.

To address maternal deaths, the American Rescue Plan Act, signed into law by President Biden in 2021, allows states to extend Medicaid coverage for a full year postpartum. Texas’s most recent legislative session addressed postpartum coverage. The state House passed a bill to extend our postpartum coverage to 12 months — meaningful legislation to address disparities in maternal health care. Unfortunately, the legislation was modified in the Texas Senate to reduce the coverage to six months. While we are glad to have increased maternal coverage, the legislation fell short of what is needed in Texas, though allowed by Medicaid. Dallas House member Toni Rose said, “When it comes to saving lives of Texas mothers, ‘splitting the difference’ is not appropriate.”

When our legislature convenes next year, two items will save lives in Texas: extending postpartum coverage to 12 months and expanding Medicaid coverage to approximately 1.5 million Texans. Many of these uninsured residents are people of color and the most vulnerable to maternal mortality.

We can help the maternal mortality problem in Texas by working collaboratively for increased health-care coverage, access, and outcomes for the good of all Texans.

Stephen Love is President/CEO of the Dallas-Fort Worth Hospital Council.

Vol. 3 2020-2021

Deaths of Despair Across America

The American Communities Project is undertaking a 30-month study of Deaths of Despair in its 15 community types.

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Law

On the Legality and Morality of Abortion, Americans Split Along Geographic Lines

by Ari Pinkus January 24, 2022

As the battle over abortion rights flares anew at the state and federal levels, American public opinion on the legality and morality of abortion has been notably stable these past several years, according to Gallup surveys from 2014 to 2021. A majority of Americans agree that abortion should remain a legal option.

How wide or narrow the legal window should be varies by community type, according to an analysis by the American Communities Project. On the whole, residents in diverse, urban, economically stratified communities that voted for Democrats Hillary Clinton or Joe Biden support broader legality. Those in rural and religious communities that voted for Republican Donald Trump tend to want more constraints.

On the moral question, Americans are nearly split between whether abortion is acceptable or unacceptable. Here, too, place of residence plays a role in how people see the issue — but views are deeper and diverge much more between urban and rural communities.

Parsing Legality

Overall, 42% of Americans support abortion being legal under any or most circumstances, while another 36% say it should be legal in only a few circumstances, and 19% say it should be illegal in all circumstances, according to Gallup surveys from 2014 to 2021.

When drilling down by the American Communities Project typology, the diversity of racial/ethnic backgrounds, urban geography, stratified socioeconomic conditions, political orientation, and youth populations likely account for supportive views of abortion rights. The 106 Urban Suburbs ringing cities, the 47 Big Cities, and the 154 College Towns show the most support for legal abortion in any circumstance at 35%, 34%, and 32%, respectively. These community types supported Biden and Clinton in 2020 and 2016, respectively.

Comparatively, a plurality of Evangelical Hubs, Rural Middle America, and Military Posts say abortion should be legal in only a few circumstances. These communities are broadly characterized by adherence to tradition, religion, and discipline, and most sit in rural America. They all supported Trump in 2020 and 2016 by large margins.

  • For the 372 Evangelical Hubs, lower-income, less college-educated, evangelical Christian communities in the South and Midwest, 46% say abortion should be legal in only a few circumstances.
  • For the 89 Military Posts, middle-income, younger, mostly rural communities scattered around the country, 44% hold the same view.
  • For the 599 Rural Middle American middle-income counties stretching along the upper half of the county, it’s also 44%.

When it comes to making abortion illegal in all circumstances, none of the communities is even close to 50% supporting, though a few hover close to one-third.

  • 32% of those in the 161 Hispanic Centers based in the rural Southwest, Texas, and Florida, which are home to younger, lower-income, Latino-dominated populations;
  • 32% of those in the 337 Working Class Country communities in Appalachia, the Ozarks, and the upper Midwest, with lower-income, less-diverse, and less-college educated residents; and
  • 31% of those in the Evangelical Hubs.

Probing Morality

The question of morality is fraught and split. Overall, 44% of Americans see abortion as morally acceptable, 47% say it is morally unacceptable, and 8% say it depends on the situation, according to Gallup surveys.

Digging in at the community level shows a deep divide by rural/urban geography. Abortion is considered morally acceptable for 52% of residents in Big Cities, 50% of those in College Towns, and 49% in Urban Suburbs.

Sizable majorities in most kinds of rural communities consider abortion morally unacceptable, including:

  • 68% in Evangelical Hubs,
  • 65% in the African American South,
  • 60% in Hispanic Centers,
  • 58% in Working Class Country, and
  • 55% in Rural Middle America.

These surveys illustrate how Americans’ views are clear and consistent on an issue that continues to divide the nation. But a majority of Americans also continue to agree that abortion should be legal in at least some circumstances.

NOTE: This post originally also referenced the Aging Farmlands, LDS Enclaves and Native American Lands. Those references were removed because the polling sample sizes were too small.

Vol. 3 2020-2021

Deaths of Despair Across America

The American Communities Project is undertaking a 30-month study of Deaths of Despair in its 15 community types.

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Culture

America Is Facing a Civic Virus

by Rich Harwood December 09, 2021

Today in a time of a global pandemic, economic upheaval, and political turmoil, The Harwood Institute for Public Innovation set out to gain a deep understanding of how Americans from all walks of life, from communities across this country, experience their lives and see the nation. Given the complex challenges facing the country, the Institute wanted to ensure that we engaged a genuine cross-section of Americans. So, we turned to the American Communities Project (ACP) to help us find a collection of voices.

We routinely hear that Americans are “polarized,” but in our work, we found that this word sorely misdiagnoses what ails us. Rather than being “polarized,” Americans are profoundly isolated and disoriented, producing a fight or flight response within people. The Harwood Institute will release our newest study early next year.

“A Walk Across the Country”

We chose to work with American Communities Project because of its rigorous and robust typology of the U.S. Importantly, the ACP’s framework captures and reflects the diverse cultural, socioeconomic, and political perspectives of the country. And the ACP typology is backed up by the best academic research and journalism in America.

In 1991, The Harwood Institute released “Citizens and Politics: A View from Main Street,” the first in-depth study to reveal Americans did not feel “apathetic” about politics but felt disconnected and pushed out. That report received widespread national attention and helped to reframe public discourse. Since then, we have traveled the country every three to five years to engage Americans on the state of the country and their lives. Now, almost exactly 30 years after our initial report, we set out once again to understand the mood of America. This time, we “traveled” the country via Zoom.

A Critical Framework

We activated our network of public innovators to host in-depth, two-hour focus group conversations (see map below) in each of the 15 county types that make up the ACP framework. Our partners included a variety of entities each deeply rooted in their respective community; conversation organizers included community foundations, United Ways, public libraries, a public media station, committed individuals, a Native American organization, among others.

A View of America

In our conversations, we found that conventional wisdom about how Americans are experiencing the state of the nation and their lives is wrong in 2021 just as it was in 1991. This new report reveals there is another virus infecting the nation — a civic virus that has been incubating and mutating for decades — that is pervasive, contagious, and perilous to our civic health.

Our forthcoming report details the nature and effects of this civic virus and what we can do about it. Here’s a quick summary of what we found:

● People are separating and segregating themselves from one another due to unrelenting fear and anxiety about what’s happening around them and to them;

● Many leaders and news media are intentionally stoking polarization for their own self-interest, with social media helping to create and amplify these divisions. This is producing a ceaseless surround sound that is engulfing people, subjecting people to an alternate reality that confuses, disorients, and destabilizes them;

● Seeing no way out, people are in an instinctive fight or flight response, many breaking up into smaller “tribes” and camps to protect themselves and gain validation, while others retreat from engaging at all.

In the time since “Citizens and Politics,” the conversation in the nation has shifted dramatically — from the problem is “out there” involving elected officials, news media and special interests to the problem is now “within all of us.”

Making use of the ACP typology, The Harwood Institute was able to tap into distinct areas of the country; and while we heard differences in how people are experiencing life and see the nation from place to place, we heard an unmistakable message across these areas about how isolated and disoriented people feel today — something fundamentally different from polarization.

For those who are interested in the state of our nation, and what can be done to bring people together and get things done, this will be an important report. Join The Harwood Institute’s newsletter to be the first to receive this new report, which will be released in early 2022.

Rich Harwood is President & Founder of The Harwood Institute for Public Innovation.

Vol. 3 2020-2021

Deaths of Despair Across America

The American Communities Project is undertaking a 30-month study of Deaths of Despair in its 15 community types.

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Culture

Why News Is Skewed to the Rich, White, and Blue — and How to Fix It

by Ari Pinkus November 30, 2021
Associate Professor Nikki Usher on her new book, “News for the Rich, White, and Blue.”

University of Illinois Associate Professor Nikki Usher is an expert on news production in the shifting digital environment — a hot topic, growing more pressing amid distrust and inequity. Her latest work News for the Rich, White, and Blue: How Place and Power Distort American Journalism explores how the news industry got to this place and how it can achieve a more equitable future.

Recently, I caught up with Usher to find out more about trends in news, how the ACP types aided her research, and her recommendations for making journalism better.

Ari Pinkus: Why and how is news skewed to “the rich, white, and blue”?  

Nikki Usher: Well, to some extent news has long been skewed to the rich and white — those are audiences that have long been desirable to sell to advertisers (we forget that news outlets are really reselling audience attention to advertisers).

Now that the digital ad model has collapsed, we’ve got a situation where revenue has to come from readers. That means digital subscriptions or memberships — and the news (or at least high-quality news) becomes limited to those who can/will pay/realize the social value of paying for news, and reifies existing problems with the presumption of white audiences as the main customers.

Newsrooms, too, are increasingly struggling with diversity, as it becomes more and more financially precarious to take the risk of becoming a journalist — and that has a downstream impact for coverage.

The blue part, well, that’s the part that’s maybe most depressing: the vast majority of people who still trust the news media — or the news media as anyone on this site might define it — well, they’re blue — democrats. This is just the reality of the mainstream news media’s audience. These audiences remain the ones willing to pay, especially for subscriptions to midsize and national news outlets.

Pinkus: How have media outlets become out of touch with the democracy they are supposed to serve?  

Usher: The biggest news outlets with the biggest national news audiences are those most likely to survive. There aren’t that many, so you might think: New York Times, Washington Post, CNN, and some digital-first outlets, maybe.

This has two consequences: These large outlets are simply not embedded in communities — and to work at them, you have to be top of the line or seen as such, which often involves having elite credentialing. This means that the type of people in newsrooms, the type of places they are from or see themselves as belonging to, well, they simply are disconnected from a lot of what we see in rural or multicultural places in the U.S.

When it comes to newspapers, which have long provided the most original coverage about any one place, we see significant cutbacks in many, many communities — so journalists are literally growing geographically farther from people and there are fewer to cover bigger expanses of geography. There’s a physical distancing, too, and that compounds cultural, political, and social distancing. I was able to figure this out in part because I was more interested in the types of places that were losing news versus just the geographic or political orientation of places losing news.

Pinkus: How did the American Communities Project typology help you in your research? 

Usher: I used the ACP typology for two chapters in the book — and I can’t imagine thinking about the loss of news and the potential for rehabilitating local news without thinking about the types of communities that are losing news.

What ACP’s typology offers is a way to think about places that is tangible and evocative and methodologically discrete enough to stand up to peer review. The cluster analysis is not just demographic, it also includes marketing data, which to me, makes it much closer to how life is lived versus a county of people in a place. When you say African American South or Exurbs, the places and your imaginaries of them are immediately evident — and that makes America into more than just blue and red, rural or urban, coastal/heartland.

When you mix in other data, like Bureau of Labor Statistics data on newspaper employment per county or the UNC News Desert data set, all of a sudden, the trends become so much more visible — you can imagine in your head what it might mean, for instance, when Rural Middle America experiences a contraction in local news and imagine these places and these scenarios in your head (particularly if you’ve been in places that map on to the typologies).

So for one chapter, we looked at where so-called news deserts were, what political leans they had, and whether journalists were indeed further concentrating in big, blue cities, which ACP calls, conveniently, “Big Cities.”

In another chapter, we looked at where flows of nonprofit philanthropic dollars for investigative journalism were going — were they going to places that had a deficit of news coverage relative to their population? Were these dollars flowing more to one community type versus another? Was there evidence that philanthropy for journalism was just going to end up reproducing the same inequities and exacerbating the same problems that the commercial news media had created and fostered?

Pinkus: What surprised you most in your findings?

Usher: This book felt like a journey of discovery, so I wouldn’t say there was just one finding that surprised me.

But when it comes to what the ACP data helped me see: well, first, there are places that have simply always been so-called news deserts. Some places — some community types — have just been historically overlooked and underinvested by the commercial news media. I mean, this is a central point to the book, so it was helpful to say, you know, the Native American Lands, the African American South, and Working Class Country have not (by our data) had many journalists working in them to begin with, so they were already “news deserts” even before major contractions in the news industry.

I was also surprised to find that when you look within-industry trends for journalism that Republican counties have more journalists relative to Democratic counties — it’s not a story of red, rural America losing the news, it’s a story of some places never having had much news, and places all over losing journalism.

I was not surprised, but a little disturbed in fact, to find that most of the nonprofit dollars flowing to investigative journalism were going to big blue cities and college towns — big city foundations giving to places that they were already familiar with. That was even more of an indication to me that there were really problematic trends in the political economy of the news media, or how the money and the power flow when it comes to making sure that people have access to news and information that gives them a sense of place and a stake in democratic life.

Pinkus: What does the local news landscape look like today?  

Usher: It depends where you are and it depends what it means to be local. Many places with solid resources — wealth, educated populations, a strong sense of civic efficacy or community — those places may be losing legacy news media, but they are replacing them in many cases with some really fantastic digital-first efforts, from small-town blogs to what I’ve been seeing in Chicago, which are locally-focused, service-minded digital first outlets dedicated to serving specific communities with news that they need to navigate daily life.

In other places, there are these weekly local newspapers that were never “hard news” to begin with, and often quite conservative, actually, and those are struggling to survive. They simply can’t keep up with fast-moving information needs (consider Covid-19) and the advertising base in many rural areas is simply, well, Graying America, Aging Farmland — let’s just say these places are losing people and losing businesses, too. There’s no advertising base, a limited population to serve, and people need more on-demand news.

That’s where platforms like Facebook come in — serving as a place for people to seek out information not just about the country but about where they live, and community news pages have become the front page, home page, and bulletin board for many local communities. This is a real problem, because Facebook is NOT a company that prioritizes democracy, it prioritizes profit.

Pinkus: Where do you see it heading?

Usher: This is a great question. The darkest version of the outcome: the New York Times, the WSJ, and the Washington Post are the only daily newspapers left standing, and have dispensed reporters to places that have limited local news to meet a need of would-be local news subscribers.

These journalists would be coming from the big cities with limited local knowledge but lots of journalism chops, and other than local television news, which is nominally local, and public media, which is chronically under-resourced, that might be all we have.

Or, we end up moving past the idea that journalism needs to look like journalism, a professional product — and unbundle journalism — some local institutions can provide news, but journalists can dedicate their efforts to the unique contributions that only journalists can make (probably accountability journalism).

Pinkus: What are your recommendations for how journalism can better reflect and address the diversity of issues and readers across the country? 

Usher: First, I think we need to diversify and empower journalists from historically marginalized groups — BIPOC, Rural America, and so forth.

If we are going to have a partisan media environment, we might as well lean into it — and maybe we should encourage partisan original news gathering (heresy, I know) — and perhaps even party donor-based news, which definitely is happening on the Right.

I think we need to seriously think about how to reform higher education in ways that diversify all industries but would diversify journalism, too — change student federal work study to include participation on college campus publications or college internships at public media on university campuses, make working for nonprofit journalism outlets clearly part of student financial aid relief, and provide meaningful salaries with health insurance rather than scattered fellowships to people from historically marginalized groups.

Vol. 3 2020-2021

Deaths of Despair Across America

The American Communities Project is undertaking a 30-month study of Deaths of Despair in its 15 community types.

Learn More
Health

Probing the Divides Between Communities on Vaccination Rates

by Dante Chinni November 17, 2021

Covid-19 vaccination rates continue to rise across all the community types in the American Communities Project, but not at the same rate. Some places that were initially slow to get jabbed have seen a notable uptick in injections, but others have slowed.

The net result: The national full vaccination number is about 52%, but there is a wide gap between the top and bottom community types (the Urban Suburbs and Evangelical Hubs, respectively) and it has not closed. This trend continues the uneven landscape that may make containing the virus difficult. However, the speed at which vaccinations are increasing in other places might also be viewed as a hopeful sign for those communities. (A person is considered fully vaccinated two weeks after receiving the second dose of the Moderna or Pfizer vaccine or receiving one dose of the Johnson & Johnson vaccine.)

Those are just two of the findings in a vaccine data project between the US COVID Atlas at the Center for Spatial Data Science at University of Chicago and the ACP at Michigan State University.

On the whole, the data suggest that the big dangers from Covid — serious cases and hospitalizations — are likely to be a function of the kind of community in which you live and the people with whom you socialize.

Climbing Above 50%

When the ACP and the US COVID Atlas last checked on vaccination rates in our 15 types in late September, we found seven of them had full-vaccination rates of 50% or more. That number has now climbed to 10 communities types where the fully-vaccinated rate is above 50%.

They are, in order of vaccination rate as of November 11:

  1. Urban Suburbs,
  2. Big Cities,
  3. College Towns,
  4. Native American Lands,
  5. Exurbs,
  6. Graying America,
  7. Middle Suburbs,
  8. LDS Enclaves,
  9. Hispanic Centers, and
  10. Military Posts.

Those last three types are the new entries on the over 50% list.

In addition, since September the top community types, the Urban Suburbs and Big Cities, have both climbed above the 60% fully-vaccinated marker.

Meanwhile, five community types remain stubbornly under 50%. From the highest to the lowest rates, they are:

  1. Rural Middle America,
  2. African American South,
  3. Aging Farmlands,
  4. Working Class Country, and
  5. Evangelical Hubs.

Those last two types were actually under 40% fully vaccinated at the beginning of November.

You can see those numbers on the charts below and see the changes over time. (Note: Due to incomplete data, Texas and Hawaii were excluded from this analysis.)

Making Progress, Fast and Slow

Look at the line chart above and you will see sharply different slopes for some communities. There are clusters around the 10% and even 25% vaccinated marks, but after that point they tend to climb at very different rates.

For instance, the populations of the Urban Suburbs and Rural Middle America hit the 25% fully vaccinated mark within days of each other (April 18 and April 21, respectively), but then the Urban Suburbs shot up. They hit the 50% mark on July 1 and the 60% mark on October 6. As noted above, Rural Middle America has yet to hit 50% of its population vaccinated.

In each of the types, parts of the populations were eager to get vaccinated. Most of the types hit the 10% mark within three weeks in March. But after that very different attitudes about Covid vaccines seem to surface depending on the community type.

Those different attitudes continued through the rise of the Delta variant this fall.

Consider the five community types still under 50% fully vaccinated. Since September, they have been on different paths.

The Military Posts and African American South, in particular, have seen their vaccination rate climb sharply, in the eight-point range since this same date in September. The Evangelical Hubs have seen a slower increase, about 6.3 points since September.

Those numbers are above the median increase in vaccination rates in all the types, 6 points.

But the other three types have seen vaccination rates rise more slowly. Working Class Country has climbed by about 5.6 points. Rural Middle America has increased by about 5.3 points. And the Aging Farmlands have inched up only 4.2 points.

Those slow increases, combined with the lower overall vaccination rates in those places, suggest getting the nation on the same page with the vaccine is likely going to take time — if it ever happens.

The combination of factors driving vaccine hesitancy are complicated. Some of it may be about sparsely populated places feeling less threatened because there are fewer large gatherings. Some may be about government distrust, particularly among communities that lean to the right politically as many rural communities do.

But the uptick in at least some of those rural communities is a positive sign we will continue to watch.

Vol. 3 2020-2021

Deaths of Despair Across America

The American Communities Project is undertaking a 30-month study of Deaths of Despair in its 15 community types.

Learn More

Unpacking the Geography of America’s Youth Suicide Epidemic

by Dante Chinni October 22, 2021 Print

The dangers and challenges young people in the United States face are well-known. Gangs and online predators are the subject of podcasts and newsmagazines. And the continuing list of school shootings, from Columbine to Parkland, has sadly become familiar to Americans.

But for many young people, the bigger danger comes from within, in the form of self-harm. Other than unintentional injury, suicide is the leading cause of death for Americans ages 10 to 24, according to the Centers for Disease Control. In 2019, the number for suicide was higher than for homicide, influenza, and liver disease combined in that age group, according to the CDC.

And the problem has only gotten worse for young people in the United States. In the period from 2000–2004, there were 7.0 suicides per 100,000 people in the 10- to 24-year-old age group. By 2015–2019, the figure had climbed to 10.03. That’s an increase of 43%, nationally.

To understand the scale of the challenge, the American Communities Project worked with Center on Rural Innovation to analyze 20 years of suicide figures from the CDC’s WONDER database. That analysis found that suicide rates among young people had risen in every one of the ACP’s 15 community types over that time, from the densely-packed Big Cities to the sparsely-populated Aging Farmlands and everything in between. The work, funded by a grant from the Arthur Blank Family Foundation to study Deaths of Despair in America, shows just how deep the nation’s suicide epidemic goes.

Looking through the ACP’s prism of 15 community types, clear place-based patterns emerge for the suicide rates among 10- to 24-year-olds, the focus of this report.

  • Rural communities have seen some of the highest rates in suicide in the age group and some of the biggest increases since 2000.
  • The suicide rates of Native American Lands are far above all the other types, with rates more than double that of some of the other types.
  • Hispanic Centers and African American South communities have lower rates of suicide than the national average, even though many are rural.

What’s driving the increase in suicides among the young is not fully understood. One commonly cited factor is the rise of smartphones and social media sites and applications. Recent revelations about the toxic impacts of Facebook and Instagram, which is owned by Facebook, have made headlines. A former Facebook employee recently told Congress the company’s internal research found that 13.5% of teen girls said Instagram worsens suicidal thoughts, while 17% of teen girls said Instagram contributes to their eating disorders.

It’s too easy to blame social media entirely for these increases, however. Young people face a range of stressors in their daily lives, and the unsettled political and socioeconomic conditions in the United States in recent years may play a role.

More important, the data show that the community types with the highest youth suicide rates also seem to be the ones with higher rates of suicide for the general population. That is, the numbers suggest there is a place-driven component to the nation’s suicide epidemic linked to a variety of ground-level factors, including access to local mental health-care providers, general community attitudes toward mental health, and differing levels of family and community social capital.

Those place-based differences shed new light on this topic. While there can be little doubt that social media and the “virtual world” play roles in increasing suicide rates among the young (perhaps even a large role), the data in this report present an argument for the importance and power of the physical world. In short, the numbers suggest that where people live and the people with whom they interact in their communities matter a lot.

The ACP has written this piece in advance of our short documentary on teen suicide in rural Park County, Montana, a Graying America community near Bozeman. We sought to understand youth suicide in a rural community at the ground level by talking to people who have been impacted and witnessing how the community is addressing the problem. Early next year, the ACP plans to release the film, funded by the Blank Foundation and the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation. A short trailer is below.

The documentary and this report focus on 10- to 24-year-olds because the suicide increase in this age cohort is especially alarming. It’s a sign that the nation’s challenges around mental health and well-being — including Deaths of Despair from alcohol, drug overdose, and suicide — don’t just affect the nation’s aging white population. The challenges concern all races and ethnicities and even strike at the nation’s youngest populations.

This report is by no means the final word on the issue of youth suicide and geography, but should be an opening for further inquiry.

The Overall Numbers and the Spikes

The chart below shows the suicide rates per 100,000 people in the 10-to-24-year age group in all the ACP types since 2000, broken into five-year intervals. The bars show how the suicide rates in all 15 types have increased since 2000. Some types have experienced greater increases than others, but no community type has been immune.

Some spikes stand out, particularly the Evangelical Hubs, LDS Enclaves, and Native American Lands.

The Urban/Rural Divide

One noticeable trend in the data: suicide rates are highest among the ACP’s more rural communities. From 2015-2019, the seven community types with the highest rates of youth suicide were:

  1. Native American Lands (41.8 per 100,000),
  2. LDS Enclaves (17.3),
  3. Military Posts (14.4),
  4. Evangelical Hubs (13.9),
  5. Graying America (13.7),
  6. Working Class Country (13.4), and
  7. Aging Farmlands, where the rate is 22.0, but it excludes ages 10 to 14 because those data are not available due to small sample sizes.

On the other end of the spectrum, the community types with the lowest suicide rates are the most urban, the Urban Suburbs (7.9) and Big Cities (8.3).

The urban/rural differences are notable. Even excluding the Native American Lands, which are an outlier in the data (we have devoted a section to them below), the rates in the LDS Enclaves were more than twice what they were in the Big Cities and Urban Suburbs. Other rural community types are more than 60% above those urban areas.

In a sense, the higher numbers in rural America may be surprising. Rural communities are often considered tightly-knit, with strong social capital, while urban communities are described as big and impersonal. And rural communities, such as the Evangelical Hubs, LDS Enclaves, and Aging Farmlands, are places where people tend to know each other well.

However, rural places are also less likely to have easy access to mental health care. The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation’s County Health Rankings and Roadmaps shows the challenges in some communities.

  • The median Big City county has one mental health-care provider for every 320 people.
  • The median Evangelical Hub county has one for every 1,280 people.
  • The median Working Class Country county has one for every 1,300 people.
  • And there are so few mental health-care providers in the Aging Farmlands, the County Health Rankings doesn’t even measure a median.

To be clear, having more mental health-care providers in a community does not necessarily mean suicide rates are lower.

A couple of community types, the African American South and Hispanic Centers, have even fewer mental health-care providers per capita (one for every 1,310 and one for every 1,530 respectively). Both were below the national average for suicides among the young. Meanwhile, Graying America has a more mental health-care professionals per capita than other rural places, one for every 620 people, but their youth suicide rates consistently still well above the national average.

The lower numbers in the African American South and Hispanic Centers is a trend we saw in Deaths of Despair overall, as well. It may be that deeper familial or community bonds in these places help insulate them from some of the problems rural white communities face.

Why do rural communities see higher suicide rates? There are several theories.

One is isolation. Young people tend to seek out socialization and that can be harder in rural communities. Getting together with friends can be difficult when they live miles away. A related factor can be pressure to conform. On the ACP’s recent trip to Montana, people cited the pressure to fit into standard roles. For young people who are outside what’s considered the social mainstream, particularly in their sexual and gender identities, that pressure can be immense. In small schools and communities, it can be hard for those who are different to find like-minded souls.

Smartphones might actually play favorable and unfavorable roles. Young people in rural communities can use the mobile devices to connect to a much broader world, but that bigger world can also feel very distant to them.

And rural communities, often home to hunters, tend to have more guns. Firearms are the leading means of suicide in the United States.

What’s Happening in Native American Lands

The Native American Lands deserve special attention. The figures in those communities are so far above the rest of the ACP types that they don’t seem to be measuring the same data.

Overall, the figures for the Native American Lands are stark. Among 10- to 24-year-olds, more than 41 people per 100,000 took their own lives annually from 2015 to 2019. In urban areas, such as the Big Cities and Urban Suburbs, the figures look radically different for the same time period. But the figures in the Native American Lands even dwarfed numbers where the suicide among the young is bigger issue, such as LDS Enclaves, the next highest community type with a rate of 17.3 per 100,000.

And even those numbers understate the challenges in the Native American Lands. The figures among older members of the age group, those ages 20 to 24, are extremely troubling. More than 67 per 100,000 people in that age group committed suicide annually in the Native American Lands from 2015 to 2019. The next highest community type for that age group in that period was the Aging Farmlands, where the figure was 27 per 100,000.

When you see the figures for the age group on a line chart with all the other ACP types, you get a sense of the difference.

These kinds of numbers in the Native American Lands are all too familiar in the ACP’s analyses. In our Deaths of Despair work, these communities consistently sit far above the other 14 community types. The numbers serve as a reminder of the special challenges the Native American Lands face.

Many are struggling economically due to a combination of extremely rural locales with little outside investment, low median household incomes, and low college education rates. For young people, the future can look daunting. Add into the mix a lack of mental health-care providers and the issues pile up. Veteran journalist Ray Suarez examined the complex interlocking issues in the Native American Lands in Montana earlier this year.

The numbers show that the mental health challenges begin at a young age in these communities, and would seem to argue for more money and attention on early intervention. The challenges only grow as the population ages.

Communities of Color and Other Points in the Data

One consistent point in the ACP’s work on Deaths of Despair: how a few community types stand against the broader geographic trends in the data, the African American South and Hispanic Centers. Both types tend to be rural, have lower incomes, and lower college education rates. However, their Deaths of Despair figures are consistently lower than other rural communities. That trend continues with suicides among the young.

In 2015-2019, Hispanic Centers’ 8.8 suicides per 100,000 people among 10- to 24-year-olds was close to the lower numbers in the Big Cities and Urban Suburbs. The numbers in the African American South were higher at 9.2 per 100,000, but still below the national figure (10.03) and lower than the numbers in rural white communities. And, as noted above, there are relatively few mental health-care providers in these communities. In fact, the numbers are lower in these communities than in any other, except the Aging Farmlands.

The County Health Rankings shows both of these community types score fairly high for “social associations” (that’s the number of membership associations per 10,000 population). But other community types score higher, including the Aging Farmlands, where the suicide rates are higher.

Looking at several other measures (above-average childhood poverty, below-average high school completion) young people in the African American South and Hispanic Centers face steeper challenges than those living elsewhere. Yet the lower suicide numbers suggest the data are not catching everything. There seems to be a resilience built into these communities that is worthy of more study.

Two youth-oriented communities, College Towns and Military Posts, also present interesting points to study. The ACP tends to view those communities as different sides of the same coin. Both are full of younger people at a critical juncture of their lives, usually living away from home for the first time but on very different paths.

They look quite different in the suicide data for 10- to 24-year-olds. College Towns, at 9.1 suicides per 100,000 people, were below the national average in the 2015-2019 time period, while the Military Posts at 14.5 were well above it. Much is sometimes made of the stresses young people face in college — and the 9.1 figure is higher than the numbers for the Big Cities and Urban Suburbs — but compared to other community types, the College Towns' number is actually fairly low. The number for the Military Posts, however, places it just behind the LDS Enclaves as the community type with the third-highest rate.

That higher rate in the Military Posts could be tied to a variety of other factors. For instance, some soldiers face PTSD upon returning home from the battlefield. And, of course, these communities tend to have a large number of firearms, including stores selling firearms. Guns are far and away the leading means of suicide in the country. In 2019, firearms were used in just over half of all suicides, according to data from the Suicide Prevention Resource Center. The next highest means was suffocation at 29%. It stands to reason that suicides would be higher in a community where firearms are readily available.

Also of note in the urban/rural split, there are differences within urban areas. The Big Cities and Urban Suburbs were both below the national average for youth suicides in the 2015-2019 period, but the Middle Suburbs (10.7 per 100,000) and Exurbs (11.1) were above the national average for suicides among the young. Those higher numbers are somewhat surprising, particularly in the Exurbs, where families tend to have higher incomes and more comfortable lifestyles.

One possible factor is both have fewer mental health providers than their more urban counterparts, one for every 510 people in the Middle Suburbs and one for every 840 in the Exurbs. But another factor could be that those community types have higher percentages of white, non-Hispanic people, 80% in the median Exurban county and 85% in the median Middle Suburb. As mentioned above, suicide seems to be a bigger scourge in white, non-Hispanic communities.

And, in the Exurbs in particular, there may be other pressures. On a trip to Douglas County, Colorado, an Exurb outside of Denver, we heard from local residents about the pressure to “keep up with the Joneses” and try to “have it all.” We heard those stories concerning parents, but they could well be impacting younger people as well.

Conclusions and Next

Taken together, the numbers here show the size of America’s youth suicide problem and the complexities lying under it. The differences in the ACP community types are deep. Some are densely populated and some are very rural. Some are racially and ethnically diverse and others are not. Some are wealthy and others struggle with poverty. But all saw suicides among youth rise in the past two decades.

Yet the differences between the numbers in these places are a sign that easy solutions will likely not be easy to find. Rural communities in particular seem to be facing deeper challenges, but those with large communities of color have avoided the worst numbers. Access to mental health-care providers seems to be an issue, but, looking at the data, it doesn’t appear to be determinative.

It may be that the best way to understand the differences between these places is doing much deeper research and reporting on the ground. The coming ACP short documentary on Park County, Montana, will offer an example of what that kind of look can provide and explore how one community has tried to address the problem. But there is much work to be done. The numbers laid out in this report should mark a first step toward a greater understanding of a troubling and growing problem.