Diversity

Diverse, Yet Homogenous: Self-Sorting in Today’s America

by Dante Chinni April 27, 2026

In 2026, the United States is a study in contradictions.

In many ways, the nation’s population has never been more diverse or fragmented — in race and ethnicity, in faiths represented, and in languages spoken. Politically, it is deeply divided. And economically, the disparities between rich and poor, measured by tools like the Gini Index, are at or near all-time highs.

Yet, data from the American Communities Project finds that people say their friends and neighbors are quite similar to them. On important measures at the local level — politics, economic status, religious practices, and educational attainment — people don’t seem to feel divided at all. Rather, they seem to feel at home among kindred spirits.

That dichotomy — national diversity and local homogeneity — may be at the center of the deep divisions in the country and a big reason why they will likely be difficult to overcome.

A Nation of Different Tribes

This understanding of the nation is central to the American Communities Project’s work.

The United States is vast — 340 million people spread across 3.5 million square miles of land. (That’s the diversity.) But depending on where you stand at any particular moment, the country can look and feel very different. And within those different places, there tends to be more common backgrounds and commonly held beliefs. (That’s the homogeneity.) You can see it across a variety of measures.

In 2025, the ACP asked more than 5,000 people in its 15 community types whether they thought they were “mostly similar” or “mostly different” from the people in their community on a range of issues. “Mostly similar” beat “mostly different” on every measure, and in nearly all communities, “mostly different” didn’t even come close to 40% on any issue.

Consider the attitudes on faith and religion.

The highest “mostly different” number is 36%, and it comes from respondents in the LDS Enclaves. That makes sense. Those are communities where the LDS footprint is prominent across the board, in terms of politics and culture. The non-LDS populations in those communities often feel left out in some way.

But nationally the “mostly different” number is only 29%. Even in the Evangelical Hubs, where faith and religion play big roles in community life, the “mostly different” number is only 24%. That suggests the overwhelming majority of people in those communities feel a part of the larger religious milieu.

Even in the Big Cities, a community type where the religious landscape is decidedly more complicated, less than 30% of those surveyed said they feel their religious views are “mostly different” from their community. That is, their views on religion and faith in public and in their private lives, whatever they are, are largely in line with their friends and neighbors even if their beliefs are different.

Economic Status

Economic inequality, i.e., who is winning and who is losing financially, has been a driver of national political divisions and tensions. Yet, again, when you look at the ACP’s 2025 survey data on the issue, people don’t appear to see a lot of economic disparities around them. Most people believe their friends and neighbors are essentially in the same boat economically.

Nationally, 59% of people believe their economic status is “mostly similar” to those in their community, while only 23% believe their economic status is “mostly different.”

The data here are pretty “flat” (i.e., there are not great variances in those “mostly different” numbers). Most are between 17% and 27% on that score. Only two communities produce “mostly different” numbers of 30% or higher. These two communities, the African American South and Native American Lands, tend to be deeply divided along racial lines, and those racial differences likely play a large role in these figures.

For the most part, however, these numbers show a lot of homogeneity. In 14 of the 15 types, the “mostly different” number is less than one third of those surveyed.

To be clear, such beliefs about economic status are not because these community types exist in similar economic situations. The median household incomes of the 15 types range from a little more than $42,000 in the African American South to more than twice that amount, $87,000, in the Urban Suburbs.

The “mostly similar” feelings about economic status are about feelings within each community type. Whatever economic challenges the country is facing, respondents seem to feel that their friends and neighbors are largely experiencing the same economy.

Politics

Of course, there is a tendency to say politics is different, the great American friction point. Election after election shows we are largely a 50/50 nation.

But the 2025 survey data suggest that in this area also, the local commonalities largely hold. Even in a divided country, only 30% of those surveyed nationally said their thoughts about politics were “mostly different” than those in their community.

At the community level, people in most of the 15 types were far more likely to say their thoughts about politics were “mostly similar” to those in their community than “mostly different.”

Granted, the numbers on this chart are closer than they were on the other charts — especially in the African American South and Military Posts, both community types that tend to be fairly rural with larger minority populations.

But considering the deep political divides in America, these numbers are somewhat remarkable. The “mostly different” number only hits 40% in one community type, the Native American Lands, where the figure is 41% — and even there the “mostly similar” number is 52%

That suggests that even if the nation is 50/50 politically right now, at the community level that is generally not the case. The nation’s “purple” political scene (evenly divided between red and blue) is purple because some areas are a deep hue of navy while others are a brilliant crimson.

A Complicated Challenge

That political split reveals the depth of the challenge the country faces as it tries to get through what has become a very rocky period. In fact, all the splits here do.

Viewed through a national lens, the United States is a picture of diversity and deep divides, but at the community level, the United States looks more like a nation of like-minded tribes living in different geographies and in different realities.

Real-world self-sorting, news media choices, and online algorithms only reinforce those community differences.

That means any solutions for getting through the nation’s tense time and seemingly intractable problems are probably less about breaking down walls between people than they are about building bridges between different kinds of places and appreciating them differently. People need to understand the way people in different kinds of communities live and the drivers behind their thoughts and beliefs.

The people in the diverse, cosmopolitan, and deeply blue Big Cities may not like life in the rural, faith-driven, and red Evangelical Hubs, but they probably need to understand it better. The reverse is true as well.

Getting people to do that will be no easy task, but it may ultimately be crucial to pulling the nation out of its deeply divisive state.

Vol. 3 2020-2021

Deaths of Despair Across America

The American Communities Project is undertaking a 30-month study of Deaths of Despair in its 15 community types.

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Economics

Unemployment Woes Spreading Across Urban and Rural America. What It Could Mean for 2026 Elections

by Dante Chinni April 21, 2026

When Donald Trump recaptured the presidency in 2024, the No. 1 issue for most voters was the economy. As 2026 moves along, that issue area appears to be a growing problem for the White House in the forms of inflation, low consumer confidence, and now jobs.

The latest county-level data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics shows the unemployment rate has risen across the country in the last year and in 12 of the American Communities Project’s 15 community types.

The ACP compared data from January 2026 and January 2025 and found unemployment had risen by about 0.3 percent — including in communities full of better-educated workers who tend to be better positioned to ride out tough times.

Perhaps just as noteworthy, the ACP analysis found that the labor force (those actively seeking work or employed) had dropped nationally and in nine of the 15 community types in the same period. A declining labor force figure is sometimes the sign of discouraged workers and generally not a sign of a healthy economy.

The spread of lukewarm-to-poor job news across the ACP types, with worse news in unexpected communities, suggests potential trouble in the 2026 midterms for the White House and the GOP.

Parsing Unemployment

There are a few ways of viewing the January county unemployment data.

On one hand, the national rate is still only 4.7%. That’s not awful. In fact, historically speaking, 4.7% is pretty good for county-level data, which are not seasonally adjusted, and lower than the figure was for most of Barack Obama’s time as president.

However, like most economic metrics, unemployment is a somewhat relative measure. When you are used to low unemployment, 4.7% can feel high. And 4.7% is the highest the figure has been since September 2021.

Add in the fact that the stock market is soaring and people elected the president to “fix” the economy, and you have a political challenge. That’s a lot of dissonance for voters.

In addition, the numbers look quite different at the community-type level, depending on where you are. They range from a low of 3.8% in the Aging Farmlands to a high of 6.6% in the Hispanic Centers. But the increases in specific community types also tell a story.

For instance, the 4.5% unemployment rate in the Urban Suburbs is below the national average, but only by 0.2 points. And the increase of 0.5 points since last January is higher than the national increase. The educated, high-earning Urban Suburbs are generally better positioned to handle economic stagnation or dips, but that doesn’t appear to be the case in 2026.

It’s possible that we are starting to see the beginning impacts of the adoption of artificial intelligence in those communities, as AI starts to take away lower skill “knowledge economy” jobs.

The bigger unemployment jumps in Graying America and the LDS Enclaves (0.7 points each), and the Native American Lands (0.8 points) also bear watching.

Graying America’s numbers may have something to do with dips in tourism over the last year, but the numbers in the LDS Enclaves and Native American Lands are harder to understand, other than the fact that rural communities often feel the impacts of a slowdown first. But the larger story is how unemployment is up almost everywhere.

Republicans may take some solace in the better unemployment figures in the Evangelical Hubs, Middle Suburbs, and Rural Middle America. Those three community types have seen small improvements in their unemployment rates, and they went heavily for Trump in 2024. Such improvements might make voters in those places a little more enthusiastic about turning out in November. But those relatively good unemployment figures come with a big caveat around their labor force numbers.

Looking at the Labor Force

Of the 15 community types in the ACP, only six saw an increase in their labor force this January compared with January 2025. It was an interesting mix of places: the African American South, Big Cities, and College Towns, which all tend to vote Democratic, and the Exurbs, Native American Lands, and Working Class Country, which lean Republican.

The news in those places was not uniformly positive. Look at the chart above, and you will see that the unemployment rate was up in all of them. But the fact that workers were wading into the labor pool could be viewed as a positive sign.

That wasn’t the case in most community types.

Again, it’s worth noting that the Urban Suburbs not only saw an increase in their unemployment rate but also watched their labor force number decline. That could mean trouble, and unhappy voters, in places that usually are more immune to economic slowdowns. The Urban Suburbs are reliably Democratic in their vote, and a lackluster economy could drive voters to turn out in those places.

But the bigger story is the many kinds of places where the labor force numbers are down, from the densely populated, wealthy Urban Suburbs to the quieter, pastoral communities of Graying America and Rural Middle America.

And those three Trump-voting communities that saw declines in their unemployment rate — the Evangelical Hubs, Middle Suburbs, and Rural Middle America — all saw decreases in their workforce numbers. In fact, those three communities had fewer people employed in January 2026 than they did in January 2025 — all together about 200,000 fewer people.

Sometimes unemployment rates can be deceptive. As we noted on this site recently, the Middle Suburbs and Rural Middle America both rely heavily on manufacturing jobs, which are down since last year.

It’s Still Early

Of course, as with any new set of data, these numbers represent only a moment in time. November is still months away, and conditions could improve. But there are reasons to be skeptical of a quick turnaround.

The war in Iran is likely going to leave a big wake in the economy even if it is resolved soon. Manufacturing jobs have been declining for decades. Inflation has not yet been tamed. And the concerns around AI are not likely to abate anytime soon.

(Just last week, billionaire Elon Musk went on his social media platform to call for “universal HIGH INCOME” checks from the federal government to stem any AI job loss concerns.)

Throw in the point that voter notions about the economy often get baked into the electorate months before Election Day, and it’s hard to see the economy as anything but a burden to the party in power in 2026.

The story of the January 2026 unemployment numbers in the ACP shows a lot of pain out there across the board, even in places we don’t usually see it. To be clear, these are not horrifying numbers, but they aren’t good and their broad-based nature suggests an economy that is on a strange path, unsettled and unsettling for many kinds of voters.

Vol. 3 2020-2021

Deaths of Despair Across America

The American Communities Project is undertaking a 30-month study of Deaths of Despair in its 15 community types.

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Economics

Measuring Economic Distress in American Communities from 2013 to 2023

by Victor Wooddell March 10, 2026

The last 12 years have been tumultuous. Everything from dramatic policy changes to the Covid pandemic has shocked the system, but wide economic disparities continue to be a defining issue in the United States.

Rural communities bear the brunt of hardship, but urban communities are facing economic distress, too, according to data from the Washington, D.C.-based Economic Innovation Group and analyzed by the American Communities Project.

While national average income and inflation appear to have modestly improved in recent years, this doesn’t tell the full story for many households. In many parts of the country, and for certain populations, wages have stagnated, the cost of living has steadily risen, and what we now call the “Affordability Crisis” has its roots in decades past. The pandemic imposed economic challenges on everyone, including the elimination of many jobs, and a weakened commercial sector.

Understanding the Distressed Communities Index

One way to understand these changes is by using measures of economic well-being. The Distressed Communities Index, created by the Economic Innovation Group, identifies counties and other local communities and assigns them a score based on various types of economic changes they experienced between 2013 and 2023, as recorded by the U.S. Census. While this analysis does not include the last few years, the trends that are revealed seem consistent with the state of the nation since 2024. When seen through the lens of the 15 types of American communities, the distress scores provide a way to understand who did better, who did worse, and why.

In general, rural areas started worse off, and declined more, across the entire decade, despite changes in presidential administrations, federal policies intended to assist them, and a partial economic recovery after the pandemic. This could mean that federal subsidies, even those of the Trump administration, haven’t helped these communities.

By giving each community type an average distress score, we sought to see in what ways different types of communities have experienced different economic changes and trends. This type of analysis reveals that some communities changed together while others diverged.

Parsing the Scores of Diverse and Less Diverse Communities

This analysis revealed some unexpected findings, and others that were not so surprising. The African American South and Native American Lands both started the decade of 2013–2023 as the most distressed of all the community types, suffering from entrenched poverty and low economic growth, and they ended the decade that way as well.

But the results for other rural communities were more surprising. Rural Middle America, and especially Aging Farmlands, became more distressed and experienced increased hardship as the decade wore on. Overall, the one community type that declined the most across the entire decade was the Aging Farmlands. These communities are disproportionally dominated by elderly farmers and are the least diverse racially and ethnically. Aging Farmlands have been strong supporters of the Republican Party. Donald Trump won 79% of their vote in 2020 and 77% in 2016.

It is interesting, therefore, that Trump’s economic policies appear not to have benefited them very much, nor most other rural communities. In fact, looking at the graph above, one can see that their economic distress score didn’t begin to climb until after 2015, right when one might expect them to benefit from Trump’s agricultural policies, including several billion dollars in financial aid packages.

A comparison with Rural Middle America is enlightening, because one might expect two types of rural communities to experience similar economic outcomes. While Rural Middle America saw increasing economic distress from 2013 to 2023, it has been much less, and didn’t really start until 2020, the year of the pandemic.

Graying America, which began in 2013 more distressed than Rural Middle America, ended up with a much better score, perhaps reflecting the movement of the elderly as they retire. The improvement in the economic distress scores for Graying America may be a statistical artifact of upper-middle-class Americans retiring to specific areas and elevating average household income by doing so.

Urban communities show a different pattern over the same time period. Big Cities and Urban Suburbs became moderately more distressed over the same time period. Big Cities were experiencing a slow and steady decline in economic distress until 2020, when distress increased quickly, and they have not recovered since. Urban Suburbs show the exact same pattern, though not as extreme. This jump in distress in 2020 was likely due to the pandemic. Except for Graying America, Exurbs experienced the most improvement across the decade.

The Pandemic’s Effect

The pandemic affected American communities almost across the board. Most got worse, but a few seemed to improve, including Native American Lands, LDS Enclaves, Graying America, and Evangelical Hubs.

Other community types, however, showed increasing distress during and after the pandemic, including Rural Middle America, Big Cities, and Urban Suburbs. The effect of the pandemic on urban areas makes sense, because population density is greater in those areas, making it easier for the disease to spread. Its effect on rural areas is more challenging to explain, although differences in local responses to social distancing and vaccination may be part of it.

Local v. National Economic Trends

One way to understand these trends is that localities with smaller populations, and less diverse economies, have not done as well as more densely populated areas with more businesses and other economic infrastructure. Another way is to understand that much economic growth, and decline, is local in nature, and doesn’t necessarily reflect national trends.

While the data presented here do not include the last few years since 2024, there is little to suggest that much has changed. America’s vulnerable communities continue to lag the rest of the country, and the burden of economic change continues to be borne unevenly.

What is evident is that many federal policies, intended to assist rural communities, have failed to do so. We are still in the midst of tumultuous economic change, and this is likely to continue into the foreseeable future.

Victor Wooddell is a graduate student in the Journalism program at Michigan State University. After earning an earlier degree in psychology at Wayne State University, he became a human resources manager, a nonprofit management consultant, and a college instructor. He has published articles with the Lansing City Pulse and many regional papers around Michigan, including the Detroit Free Press.

Vol. 3 2020-2021

Deaths of Despair Across America

The American Communities Project is undertaking a 30-month study of Deaths of Despair in its 15 community types.

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Politics

Despite National Focus on America’s Divisions, One Thing Unites Communities: Populism

by Dante Chinni February 23, 2026

It’s easy to look at national headlines, and the stories under them, and see a hopeless blue/red political chasm. But that isn’t completely true.

A close look at survey data from the American Communities Project shows there are some issue areas that seem to unite the right and the left as the nation hurtles through a midterm year, and the force behind them seems clear: anti-establishment populism.

Distrust of elites and “the powers that be” has become a defining part of the MAGA movement that supports President Donald Trump. But ACP survey data indicate that on a range of issues — from the media to the government to big business — distrust reigns supreme in all kinds of communities, from liberal-leaning Big Cities to conservative Aging Farmlands.

That finding doesn’t mean the nation’s deep divisions have disappeared in the ACP’s survey data, particularly around race, culture, and religion. But the survey at least suggests there are some topics and issue frames that can unite voters rather than divide them.

And the way those sets of issues are deployed and who deploys them in 2026 may reveal a lot about the upcoming midterm campaigns.

Defining Unity and Division

In 2025 (and in 2023 and 2024), the American Communities Project gave respondents a list of statements and asked if they agreed or disagreed with them. The statements touched on a host of topics, from abortion to faith to immigration.

For this purpose, the ACP then grouped the responses into two categories.

  • Uniting statements: Those where every community type was on the same side of the 50% agree mark, and where the difference between the types was 15 percentage points or less.
  • Dividing statements: Those where communities sat on different sides of the 50% agree mark, and where the difference between types was 20 percentage points or greater.

The breakdown of those statements provides an issue map for understanding where common ground does and does not exist in the United States.

The Unifiers

The chart below shows the five statements that qualify as unifiers under this breakdown, and you’ll notice a clear pattern to most of them.

Three of the statements focus on distrust of the media, traditional political parties, and the broader economy. In every one of the ACP’s 15 community types, solidly more than 50% said they distrust or don’t believe in those institutions.

It’s hard to overstate how different the ACP types are on a whole list of areas — racial and ethnic diversity, household income, educational attainment, population density. So the widespread agreement on these institutional issues is notable.

Americans’ common anti-establishment views may explain the current, unsettled, back-and-forth nature of American politics. When all these different kinds of communities — economic winners and losers — are unhappy with the powers that be, politics can vacillate. The “other” option that is not in power seems to be better, whatever that option is.

But note that the one statement with the most consistent agreement is: “The U.S. government should cut social programs in order to lower taxes.” Here there was only a 9-point difference across all the types.

Even the highest agreement for that statement was only at 29%. And this percentage came from Rural Middle America and Working Class Country, two largely rural, conservative types.

This finding at least suggests that even with all the distrust in the electorate, there is concern that the government needs to be involved in helping those who need help. And it’s worth noting that this finding has been consistent over multiple ACP surveys since 2023. It surprised us to the point that we traveled to a conservative Graying America community in Florida in 2024 and held a roundtable discussion on the topic.

There is also surprising agreement on the idea that Americans have “more in common with each other than is generally believed” across all community types.

Considering the state of political discourse in 2026, those last two uniting statements seem to be evidence of a hopeful defiance lurking in the electorate.

The Dividers

But working against that perspective is the list of issues that divides the communities of the ACP — under the well-known lines of race, religion, and culture.

Such statements yield some stark differences:

  • a 34-point divide on faith and religion as important parts of American life;
  • a 26-point difference on racism as part of the American system; and
  • a 27-point gap on the U.S. doing more to “level the playing field” for some racial and ethnic groups.

In some ways, these divides are less interesting because they follow well-known patterns.

The left-leaning Big Cities are more likely to agree that racism is deeply ingrained in the nation’s institutions and that there’s a need to address inequities. The young and liberal College Towns are the most likely to say the United States is in decline.

Meanwhile, the deeply conservative Aging Farmlands are the most likely to see faith and religion as important to the nation. And the right-leaning Evangelical Hubs are the most likely to think that people “of this country” should be hired over immigrants when jobs are scarce.

Reaching Voters in 2026 and Beyond

So, if there are issues that can unite voters, or at least issues that resonate with voters in all the different kinds of communities the ACP studies, why aren’t they a bigger part of politics? Where are the unity campaigns?

Part of the answer is that divisive issues fire up base voters and, depending on where one is campaigning, these issues can bring out more voters than they turn off. That may be doubly true in a midterm year, where the inherent question before voters is: “What do you think of this administration so far?”

But keep an eye on the uniting populist issues this year. The data suggest that the public, across all different kinds of places, is hungry for the right kind of anti-establishment voice — perhaps one that wants to take a sledgehammer to the system and remodel, rather than use a blowtorch to burn everything down.

That’s probably a discussion more suited for the 2028 presidential race, but the seeds are there now.

Vol. 3 2020-2021

Deaths of Despair Across America

The American Communities Project is undertaking a 30-month study of Deaths of Despair in its 15 community types.

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Media

As Journalists Are in the Crosshairs, What Do People Know About Who They Are and What They Do?

by Dante Chinni February 11, 2026

There is almost always an adversarial relationship between the White House and the news media, but tensions have ratcheted up under the Trump administration — from requiring special rules for news organizations in the Pentagon to the recent arrests of two journalists covering a protest in a church in Minneapolis.

As the debates heat up over the First Amendment, media organizations face a special set of challenges with the public, according to the American Communities Project/Ipsos surveys.

  • First, very few Americans say they actually know a working journalist. Journalists ranked at the bottom of a long list of professionals and/or groups that people know well.
  • Second, most people believe the mainstream media are more interested in “making money than telling the truth.”

These two findings, which may be connected, were true across all 15 community types in the American Communities Project.

Ultimately, those attitudes matter because the fights between the administration and the press seem likely to intensify, and as they do, journalists may find it harder to garner support for their work in the court of public opinion. The data show trust in the media is at a low, something the ACP wrote about late last year.

Who Knows a Journalist?

In 2024, the American Communities Project wanted a better sense of what people’s social groups looked like across the 15 community types. Our survey asked, “Do you have immediate family members or close friends who are…” and offered a long list of possible answers, everything from “immigrants” to “scientists” to “journalists.”

The number for journalists came in far below every other group named.

“Journalist or someone who works for a news organization” garnered a remarkably low 7% in the national figures, coming in 10 percentage points below the next group, “elected officials or someone who works in the government.” Journalists also came in below “scientists” at 23% and “people who live in another country” at 33%.

It’s noteworthy that some groups scored as high as they did, such as “immigrants” at 38%, “LGBTQ+ people” at 49%, and “member of a different racial/ethnic group than your own” at 61%.

At the community-type level, the numbers don’t look any better. Journalists scored lower than every other group in every type.

There are a few notable differences at the community level. For instance, the percentage who said they knew a journalist sat at 15% in the Aging Farmlands and 10% in the Native American Lands. But that may be because those communities are sparsely populated and generally more tight-knit. The local newspaper or radio reporter might be someone people run into at the grocery store.

Across the other types, most numbers were below the national average. The number was just above average, 8%, in the Big Cities and Urban Suburbs. However, on the whole, those are very low numbers.

The Impacts

What that means for most Americans is journalism probably feels pretty foreign to them. There are few talks at the dinner table or at the coffee shop about how the job is done or why a story was handled the way it was.

For a lot of Americans in all different kinds of communities, journalists are kind of an abstraction, a person people see on TV or a byline they read somewhere or a voice they hear on the radio. It makes it harder for the public to see journalists as people just doing a job — and makes it harder for them to understand the job journalists do.

Some of this is almost certainly due to the collapse of local journalism and the closure of local newspapers around the country. The Rebuild Local News coalition estimates that the number of local journalists in the United States has dropped by more than 75% since 2002. In Pittsburgh, the Post-Gazette is set to cease operations in May. And in Washington D.C., the Post just announced layoffs of more than 300 journalists, about one-third of its staff.

Being disconnected from local journalists and local news may have been a driver behind another big point in the ACP survey data, a lack of trust in the media.

Less Concerned with Truth Than Money

In 2023 and 2025, the ACP surveys offered people a list of statements with which to agree or disagree. In both years, the statement with the highest “agree” number was: “The mainstream media are more interested in making money than telling the truth.” Nationally, 75% percent agreed with that statement in 2023, and 73% agreed in 2025.

At the local level, some community types were lower, but the number who agreed never dropped below 60% anywhere. And the agree number climbed into the 80s in some places.

The numbers are relatively stable between the two years, with a few exceptions. The Military Posts saw a 10-point drop in the percentage of people saying they agreed in 2025 compared with 2023. In the Evangelical Hubs, there was a 7-point drop. It’s hard to know for certain what’s behind those drops without more reporting, but both communities were supporters of President Trump in the 2024 election.

It’s worth noting, however, that the community types of the ACP are tuned into very different media ecosystems. So the extent to which people agree on this point is somewhat surprising.

It’s possible that people in different communities have different outlets in mind when they hear the words “mainstream media.” It’s also possible that people in different kinds of communities disapprove of the “mainstream media” for different reasons — too hard on the president, too soft on the president, not enough reporting on the issues they care about.

Regardless, one thing seems clear in the data: There is a lot of distrust for the work the mainstream media are doing across the board — and not a lot of connections to the journalists doing the work.

In a tense world where quality news coverage is a necessity, that should be a deep concern for the nation’s big news organizations.

Vol. 3 2020-2021

Deaths of Despair Across America

The American Communities Project is undertaking a 30-month study of Deaths of Despair in its 15 community types.

Learn More
Politics

Why President Trump’s Approval Has Declined

by Dante Chinni February 04, 2026

As President Trump’s second term passed the one-year mark, a series of polls showed declines in his support — declines that were especially steep among some voter groups. A New York Times poll in particular showed Trump had lost all the gains he made with non-white voters, younger voters, and midterm voters.

While some were surprised by the size of the turnaround, especially among some voters, viewed through the lens of the American Communities Project, the drops aren’t surprising and probably could have been predicted in January 2025.

Because when one looks closer at the 2024 results through the eyes of the ACP’s 15 community types, it’s hard to ignore how much the vote was likely influenced by the impact of inflation and a surly electorate that wasn’t going to be soothed easily.

A Different Election

There haven’t been a lot of “normal” presidential elections in the last few cycles. Trump has changed politics in a lot of ways. Add in a pandemic, protests, and massive voter turnout, and you have a prescription for elections that feel unique.

The 2024 election looked especially different in the ACP.  Trump won what turned out to be a close race by about 2.3 million votes and 1.5 percentage points. But the Republican Party improved on its margins (from 2020) in every one of the 15 community types the ACP studies — even places that vote reliably Democratic.

How different is that? Look at the changes from 2016 to 2020 in the chart above. In 2020, Joe Biden won the White House pretty comfortably, by about 7 million votes and 4.5 percentage points — and still six of the 15 community types saw an improvement in their margins for Trump, the Republican.

That’s because, as we often note, the 15 community types in the ACP are very different places — demographically, geographically, economically, and culturally. Seeing movement in one direction in all of them is not very common.

When you see a shift like that in one election, it is likely because there is a special candidate — a person who unites the country and brings voters to his or her unique brand or personality — or special circumstance or issue that is so dominant it overrides the differences.

There are a lot of reasons to believe the latter was the driving force in 2024.

Consider Inflation

You can like President Trump or you can dislike him, but there is little doubt he is a divisive figure politically. He’s not the kind of politician who wins massive support across the board. In Gallup’s data, he has never broken 50% approval in either term.

And if you’re looking for an issue that united the country in 2024 (and 2023 and 2025 for that matter), it was inflation. The big surveys the ACP conducted in those years found that inflation was the No. 1 issue at the local and national levels in all 15 types.

Some political analysts talk about immigration as a decisive factor, but it was a distant second as the most important issue at the national level (and it was even lower in many communities). The issue of immigration barely registered locally.

And in 2025, the issue gap was the same: inflation, then everything else, nationally and locally.

In other words, the many different communities in the ACP were most concerned about inflation in 2023 and 2024. Candidate Donald Trump understood those concerns and talked a lot about them in 2024. He promised prices would come down when he was elected, which is a very difficult goal to accomplish.

In the end, the concerns among voters didn’t go away. Overall, prices did not go down. Inflation was still the top issue everywhere in the 2025 survey. And Trump shifted to talking down the idea of “affordability” (which essentially is inflation) as a “hoax.” That’s a tough line to sell when people don’t like how much they are spending at the supermarket or looking at their credit card statements every month.

Lessons In The Data?

When you look at the data that way, it’s hardly shocking Trump’s numbers have fallen. In fact, the drops look almost inevitable.

Candidates often the get the benefit of the doubt when they campaign. They aren’t making policy or the hard decisions of governing. They are making promises. And big promises can bring big belief — the kind of belief that leads every community type in the ACP to shift toward the challenger who is going to “make things better.” But if things don’t get better? Or they don’t get better as dramatically as people hope? Voters can shift — and fast.

Trump handling of the economy used to be his biggest strength in polling. Not anymore. Add in mixed feelings about how the administration is handling immigration and you get big drops in support.

There is a tendency to give elections and exit polls added weight in understanding the electorate. After all, it’s not just a poll, it’s real votes. (Women moved this much. Younger voters moved that much. Must be a trend.) But that’s often mistaken.

It’s often said that polls are a “snapshot in time.” That is true for election results as well. Elections are functions of time and place and candidates. The U.S. electorate is a deeply complicated animal. Sudden “dramatic shifts” among voters usually don’t mean much unless you see them repeatedly over time.

Vol. 3 2020-2021

Deaths of Despair Across America

The American Communities Project is undertaking a 30-month study of Deaths of Despair in its 15 community types.

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Diversity

How Views on Race Split American Communities

by Ari Pinkus January 27, 2026

Fifty years ago in February, President Gerald Ford observed Black History Month thus: “In the bicentennial year of our Independence, we can review with admiration the impressive contributions of black Americans to our national life and culture…. The last quarter-century has finally witnessed significant strides in the full integration of black people into every area of national life.”

On the cusp of the nation’s 250th anniversary, race remains a central fault line in American society that continually runs through public opinion polls. In the summer of 2023, the American Communities Project and Ipsos asked 5,000 survey respondents if they agreed or disagreed with the statement: “Racism is built into the American economy, government, and educational system.” Nearly half, 48%, said they agreed.

Two years later in the most recent poll by ACP/Ipsos, 47% of 5,000 respondents agreed. Nationally, these results are among the most discordant in our survey series, but they do not convey the full picture. Also, as with all polling, this shows a snapshot in a turbulent time.

Where Long-standing Republican-Leaning Communities Break

As the chart above shows, the degree to which residents in some Republican-stronghold communities viewed racism as an institutional problem in America dropped at least 6 points between 2023 and 2025.

  • In Working Class Country, 46% of residents felt racism was built into key American institutions in 2023, then dropped to 39% last year.
  • In Military Posts, the figure declined from 52% to 46% in the same time frame.
  • In Evangelical Hubs, it plunged 9 points, from 43% to 34%.

All three community types voted for President Trump in 2024 by large margins — Evangelical Hubs by 63%, Working Class Country by 47%, and Military Posts by 12%.

Swing Counties: Hispanic Centers

The trend was reversed in Hispanic Centers, which voted for Trump by 10% in 2024 but have felt the effects of his administration’s immigration crackdown as his second term goes on. In 2025, 53% of Hispanic Center residents agreed that racism is built into the American economy, government, and educational system. In 2023, the figure was 5 points lower, at 48%. (In 2020, Hispanic Centers voted for Democrat Joe Biden by 2%.)

Where Longtime Democrat-Leaning Communities Break

In the four Democrat-stalwart communities that voted for Kamala Harris in 2024, the views on racism mostly remained about the same over these two years, with movements of a few percentage points in either direction.

  • In 2023, 58% in Big Cities agreed that racism was an institutional problem, and in 2025, 60% said so.
  • In 2023, 54% in Urban Suburbs agreed; 52% said so in 2025.
  • In 2023, 55% in College Towns agreed; 54% said so in 2025.
  • The Democrat-leaning African American South saw a slightly larger shift — 58% initially agreed that racism was built into American institutions, whereas the number dropped to 52% in 2025.

Harris won Big Cities by 36%, Urban Suburbs by 13%, College Towns by 8%, and African American South communities by 5%.

Even the Playing Field?

While respondents are split on racism’s role in American institutions, not much appetite exists for government intervention to even the field. In the ACP/Ipsos 2025 survey, just 40% overall said: “The U.S. should do more to level the playing field for historically underrepresented groups.”

But the idea of doing more separated the community types by nearly 30 points, falling along familiar geographic and political lines. Only in Big Cities did the percentage surpass half the population. Hispanic Centers were about split at 49%. The African American South followed at 44%, the Urban Suburbs at 43%. Meanwhile, at the other end of the spectrum were rural, mostly white communities of varying means: Rural Middle America at 29%, Working Class Country at 29%, Evangelical Hubs at 33%, and LDS Enclaves at 35%.

The friction on this issue continues to churn upward and outward. On Jan. 20, 2025, President Trump signed the executive order “Ending Radical and Wasteful Government DEI Programs and Preferencing,” including cancelling diversity, equity, and inclusion initiatives across the federal government. Since then, Black employees have been disproportionately impacted by the thousands of job cuts to the federal government in 2025. In a January 2026 interview with The New York Times, Trump said in response to policies instituted after the Civil Rights Act: “White people were very badly treated, where they did extremely well and they were not invited to go into a university to college.”

It’s been more than two and a half years since the U.S. Supreme Court struck down affirmative action policies in college admissions. In October 2025, an Associated Press analysis found that “Black enrollment is waning at many elite colleges after affirmative action ban.”

To read individuals’ views of diversity programs, visit our November 2025 story: “Tailgate Talk Across America — On College Value, Diversity, and AI.”

Vol. 3 2020-2021

Deaths of Despair Across America

The American Communities Project is undertaking a 30-month study of Deaths of Despair in its 15 community types.

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Economics

Unemployment Continues Increasing Across America

by Dante Chinni January 13, 2026

Inflation dominated the consumer economic news for 2025, but the slow, steady rise in unemployment in the United States was simmering on the back burner. From January to November (the latest data available), the national unemployment rate climbed from 4% to 4.6%.

The American Communities Project also saw steady increases across all 15 community types in 2025. And county-level data from September (the latest available), showed the trend continuing with some communities seeing sharper increases.

The increases are not massive, and historically speaking, unemployment is still relatively low. That’s one reason alarms haven’t sounded. But increases have come across the board, and another year of similar bumps or larger ones would likely be felt in economic confidence indicators. These numbers are already concerning, largely due to lingering concerns about inflation.

Unemployment in the Community Types

On this site, we often note the large differences in the communities the ACP observes. It’s hard to overstate how the lived experiences and the economic realities can be so fundamentally dissimilar. Consider the densely-populated Big Cities and the rural Aging Farmlands. So, when we see consistent trends across all 15 community types, we take notice.

This latest unemployment data is an example of that consistency. We compared the unemployment rates in September 2025 and September 2024 in all the community types and found increases everywhere. (The comparison of the same month over a year is necessary because the data are not seasonally adjusted.)

Again, to be clear, these numbers are not huge. The September 2025 data ranged from 2.8% in the Aging Farmlands (where the rate is quite low) to 6.2% in the Hispanic Centers. But the fact that the numbers were higher in every community type in 2025, when there was not a recession underway, is noteworthy. It suggests a broad-based slowdown.

In addition, some of the different trends the ACP saw earlier in 2025 continue here.

The Urban Suburbs, places around major cities that tend to have higher incomes and more college degrees, saw a big jump in these year-over-year numbers. Their unemployment increase of .63 percentage points was the highest of any community type year-over-year. Usually, their higher socioeconomic standing insulates them from economic headwinds, but 2025 was an exception. The fact that the unemployment rate in the Urban Suburbs is almost even with the national rate is not common.

The increase in the Hispanic Centers, a jump of .59 points, may be tied to the nationwide immigration crackdown. Deportations along with fewer people shopping or on the street may mean drops in spending and hiring in those places.

If there is good news in these data, it may be in the African American South communities, where the unemployment rate ticked up by a slight .13 percentage points. Those communities often get hit hard when economic times get bumpy, but not in 2025.

We’ll see if those trends hold or even accelerate when we get the county-level unemployment data from November, which were delayed due to the government shutdown. The national figures showed an increase.

What’s the Forecast?

Simply put, these data don’t seem to follow a “normal” pattern and that makes 2026 harder to predict.

Why are the numbers in the Urban Suburbs climbing the way they are? Are the increases in tariffs to blame?

Considering the different economies in these places — some driven by agriculture, some by manufacturing, some by tech or trade or tourism — why is unemployment slowly climbing everywhere?

Could the expansion of artificial intelligence be to blame? There have been anecdotal accounts of businesses holding back on entry-level hiring due to the blossoming of AI.

These are questions the ACP will explore this year with different dips into data analysis and on-the-ground reporting.

Despite all the uncertainties around what’s happening in these data, the numbers may offer an answer to the larger question: Why are people nervous about the economy, as survey after survey has shown?

Yes, inflation remains a persistent problem, and we will all likely hear a lot about affordability this year, but other indicators look OK. The stock market is up. The nation’s GDP is climbing. There are reasons to not be glum.

However, it may be that the unsettled nature in these jobs data is being felt across the country in different ways — not as an economic cataclysm, but as broad economic insecurity. That is to say, people don’t understand why things aren’t better. And that makes them worry about what’s ahead.

Vol. 3 2020-2021

Deaths of Despair Across America

The American Communities Project is undertaking a 30-month study of Deaths of Despair in its 15 community types.

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Culture

Surprising Consistency on a Path to Citizenship for Long-Term Immigrants

by Dante Chinni January 06, 2026

Of all the Trump administration’s changes in the last year, those around immigration and immigration enforcement are probably the most immediately felt. Stories about arrests and detentions are all over national and local news outlets around the country.

The 2025 American Communities Project survey suggests there may be concerns about how far those new immigration policies are going.

On the survey, 59% of respondents said, “Immigrants who entered the U.S. illegally, but have been working community members for at least ten years, should be given a pathway to legal status.” In a country that feels deeply divided, that number is surprisingly high. And the response may fly in the face of the administration’s efforts to remove 1 million undocumented immigrants a year during Trump’s presidency.

The Migration Policy Institute estimates that there are 13.7 million undocumented immigrants in the United States, and 9.2 million of them have been here for 10 years or more. The Kino Border Initiative, a group established by six Catholic organizations, surveyed 278 deportees from May to June and found that 44% had lived in the United States for at least a decade.

Beyond that high 59% approval for a pathway to citizenship, however, was the surprising consistency of views across the ACP types.

Uncommon Agreement

The community types that define the ACP are a complicated mix of populations, economies, and lifestyles, but there was broad and deep agreement on the pathway-to-citizenship question. In all 15 community types, the percent who agreed that longtime residents should have a pathway to citizenship outperformed the number who disagreed by at least 18 percentage points.

(The Aging Farmlands and Native American Lands were not included on this question due to cost and time constraints.)

To be clear, there are still some sizable differences in that chart. Close to 70% in the Hispanic Centers, LDS Enclaves, and Big Cities said they agree with the statement. At the same time, only 49% in the Evangelical Hubs and Working Class Country counties said they agree. Still, the data show strong pluralities agreeing with a statement on one of the nation’s most divisive issues.

The nation’s partisan divide seems much less pronounced on this aspect as well. The statement drew large majority support in some of the communities that went heavily for Donald Trump in the 2024 presidential race — the Exurbs, Military Posts, and Rural Middle America. (Hispanic Centers and LDS Enclaves also voted for Trump.)

Different Environments

To be clear, immigration looks very different in the 15 American Community Project types. In some of them, 20% or more of the residents are foreign-born. In others, that figure sits at 3% or less.

The ACP often tries to understand different views at the community level by understanding their different “lived experiences” — what people see and feel in their daily lives. And there are signs that lived experiences are making a difference in the path-to-citizenship data.

The community types with the highest percentages of foreign-born people are also among the types that are the biggest supporters of a pathway. Look at the numbers for the Big Cities, Hispanic Centers, and Urban Suburbs. All have foreign-born populations that top 19%, and all have 60% or more residents saying they support a pathway to citizenship.

But that doesn’t tell the whole story here.

Hispanic Centers have the highest percentage supporting a pathway to citizenship (68%), and that may not be a surprise. But that 68% is tied with the LDS Enclaves, where only 8% of the population is foreign-born.

Meanwhile, College Towns and Exurbs look similar in their foreign-born populations (7.4% and 8.6% respectively), but there is a bigger gap on the question of a pathway to citizenship. In College Towns, 65% support a pathway to citizenship. In Exurbs, 57% do.

There are some reasons for all those data points. LDS Enclaves, for instance, have long been supportive of Hispanics who become LDS adherents. There are Mormon churches where Spanish is the primary language. And generally speaking, College Towns lean left politically and the views of immigrants are often shaped by foreign students who are very much a part of the university community.

Beyond Community Differences

If there is a broad takeaway from these data, it may be how people feel differently about immigrants who have been contributing members of local communities over time, regardless of how common or uncommon foreign-born residents are in those communities.

Much of the dialogue about immigrants focuses on how those incoming groups are different from the places they go — how they mean change and how change can be scary to any community. But these data suggest that attitude doesn’t apply to long-term immigrant residents, even in places that strongly supported President Trump in 2024.

If the administration continues to cast a wide net for undocumented immigrants, including immigrants who have been here for a long time, it may find public support for its immigration policies, which is already low, declining further.

Vol. 3 2020-2021

Deaths of Despair Across America

The American Communities Project is undertaking a 30-month study of Deaths of Despair in its 15 community types.

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Religion

Americans Identify With Religious Diversity, But They Divide Over Religion’s Role

by Ari Pinkus December 22, 2025

Even as millions gather to mark religious holidays in public and private spaces this month, the role of religion and faith in America remains a point of stark disagreement. In the latest ACP/Ipsos survey of 5,400 respondents, just over half (56%) said, “Religion and faith are important parts of American life.” But the variance at the community level ranged 34 points — and emphasized the country’s rural-urban divide on a signature sociocultural issue.

In very rural communities of moderate to low means, Aging Farmlands and Native American Lands, more than 75% of residents said religion and faith are important parts of American life. For Evangelical Hubs and Working Class Country, rural communities with lower-incomes based in the South, Midwest, and Appalachia, the figures were in the mid-60s. In middle-income rural communities in the country’s upper tier and interior West — Rural Middle America and LDS Enclaves — 59% of residents said religion/faith was important in American life. In African American South and Military Posts, known for their large Black populations, 57% and 52% of residents said so. On the opposite end of the spectrum were urban-oriented places: Big Cities, Urban Suburbs, and College Towns. Characterized by higher density, affluence, economic stratification, and many cultures, these communities were in the mid- to upper-40s.

Notwithstanding the divides over religion and faith in American life, attending religious services is not widely popular. Across communities, 4 in 10 said they attend religious services at least every few months. Graying America counties, where more than a quarter of residents are 65 and older, were the exception — 51% said they never attend services.

This push-pull over religion’s role at the individual and national levels was captured in journalism and research this past year, including:

Defined by Diversity

In America, religious/faith diversity appears as foundational as the right of religious freedom. Such diversity was underlined in the ACP/Ipsos survey conducted in August 2025. Respondents encompassed a multiplicity of religions as well as no religion. Nationally, Christianity in various forms was dominant, particularly Protestant denominations at 36% and Catholicism at 18%. But all the major religions as well as some smaller groups were represented. Nationally, a quarter said they were no religion. Unaffiliateds hit at least 30% in College Towns, Big Cities, and Graying America. (The full chart is too large to view below. Please visit this link.)

Those who identified as Protestant Christians, other Christians, other non-Christians, something else, or skipped the religion question were asked about being evangelical or born-again, and 56% identified this way. There was no clear urban and rural split. Percentages reached the mid- to upper-60s in the African American South, Working Class Country, and Evangelical Hubs, unsurprisingly. However, Big Cities mirrored the national average. Meanwhile, Urban Suburbs and Aging Farmlands — often apart in geography, density, diversity, educational attainment, and affluence — were both in the mid-40s.

Faith/Religious Similarities With People in Your Community

Survey respondents indicated an awareness of living among people who have different faith backgrounds and practices than their own. Asked whether they feel they have similar or different faith/religious practice than most people in their community, 49% said their practice was mostly similar, 29% said mostly different, and 22% didn’t know or skipped the question. Similarities were highest in the very sparsely populated, yet often close-knit Aging Farmlands and Native American Lands. In diverse communities — College Towns, Big Cities, Urban Suburbs, African American South, and Hispanic Centers — similarities in religious/faith practice fell below the national average. In most communities, percentages of people who didn’t know or skipped the question reached at least 20%.

 

Vol. 3 2020-2021

Deaths of Despair Across America

The American Communities Project is undertaking a 30-month study of Deaths of Despair in its 15 community types.

Learn More